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I. INTRODUCTION
The civil defense bar must have cringed on the day the California Supreme
Court handed down its opinion in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard
Oil Co. 2 Although Seaman's was a contract case, it created tort liability, in the
form of punitive damages, for a defendant's bad faith denial of the existence of
a contract. 3 The newfound liability in Seaman's gave plaintiffs another pigeon-
hole through which they could expose the deep pockets of corporate defendants
to punitive damages awards.4 However, it was evident right from the start that the
I. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,462 (1897).
2. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
3. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
4. See STEVENJ. BURTON &ERic G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUALGOOD FAITH §§ 9.2.3,9.2.3.1, at 400-
01 (asserting that Seaman's encouraged expansion of tortious breach of contract, and visions of huge damages
awards inspired plaintiffs to bring Seaman's actions). The sizes of some punitive damages awards sustained
by the courts are certainly alluring. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,465-
66 (1993) (plurality opinion) (sustaining a punitive damages award of $10 million); Browning-Ferris Indus."
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,280 (1989) (affirming a $6 million punitive damages award); Robertson
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 14 F.3d 373, 376-80 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding a total of $8 million in
punitive damages); Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 403, 650 P.2d 1171, 1180, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654,
663 (1982) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's award of $4 million in punitive
damages); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (sustaining Texaco's point
of error that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to suggest a remittitur, and reducing the jury's
original $3 billion punitive damages verdict to $1 billion on a tortious interference with contract claim). But
see BMW, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589. 1603-04 (1996) (reversing a $2 million punitive damages award
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new Seaman's tort would have difficulty ripening into a full-fledged theory of tort
liability in contract cases.5 Indeed, California courts expressed reluctance to apply
the tort, sister states refused to adopt the tort, and legal commentators leveled
heavy criticism at the new tort.6 Suggestions that the state high court reconsider
or eliminate the new tort came from all parts of the legal community.7 The
California Supreme Court heeded these requests when it overruled Seaman's in
its recent decision of Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.8
As discussed in Professor Kelso's prologue, this case forms part of the
significant imprint left on California jurisprudence by retiring Chief Justice
Malcolm Lucas.9 This Casenote specifically reviews the legal landscape of the
Seaman's tort, from its inception through its demise in Freeman & Mills, in Part
II. The thrust of the note, Part III, is a consideration of the Freeman & Mills case
itself. Part IV discusses legal and economic ramifications likely to flow from the
decision. Part V concludes by praising California's high court for restoring
adherence of contract and tort remedies to the goals of contract and tort law, and
returning needed economic stability in commercial contractual settings.
I[. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Prohibition of Punitive Damages Awards in Contract Cases
The common law has typically limited punitive damages remedies in actions
based upon contract.!t California has adopted the common law approach. " The
against a car manufacturer, who failed to disclose to a purchaser that the purchased car had been damaged and
repainted prior to delivery, as grossly excessive in light of the defendant's low level of reprehensible conduct
and the five hundred to 1 ratio of punitive damages to actual damages).
5. See infra notes 68-73 and 89-146 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 89-172 and accompanying text.
7. E.g. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 33 Cal. App. 4th 837, 840, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585, 586
(1994), afd, 11 Cal. 4th 85, 103, 900 P.2d 669, 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 431 (1995); Okun v. Morton, 203
Cal. App. 3d 805, 826, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 233 (1988); Landsdorf, supra note *, at 236-39 (advocating that
the California Supreme Court overrule Seaman's); C. Delos Putz, Jr., & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith:
Attorney Fees-Not Tort Liabilit -Is the Remedy for "Stonewalling," 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 419, 499 (1987)
(advising the state high court to correct its misstep in Seaman's); William W. Oxley, Seaman's Overboard,
L.A. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 44, 78 (urging the California Supreme Court, in Freeman & Mills, to fix its mistake
of inventing the Seaman's tort).
8. 11 Cal. 4th 85, 900 P.2d 669, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (1995).
9. See J. Clark Kelso, A Tribute to Retiring Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas, 27 PAC. Li. 1395 (1996)
[hereinafter Tribute].
10. Professor Farnsworth, renowned contracts professor, author of a leading treatise on contracts, and
reporter for the Restatement, Second, of Contracts, traces the earliest application of this rule to Addis v.
Gramophone Co., [1909] App. Cas. 488 (H.L.), in which an English appellate court denied granting punitive
damages to a plaintiff-employee even though the defendant-employer wrongfully discharged the employee
in an unnecessary and humiliating manner. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8,
at 189 n.16 (1990). American cases have also followed this trend. See Den v. Den, 222 A.2d 647, 648 (D.C.
1966) (refusing to allow punitive damages for a plaintiff-wife against the defendant-husband regardless of the
1407
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California Supreme Court has expressed two primary rationales for this tenet of
latter's bad motives in failing to make alimony payments under the parties' separation agreement); Eskew v.
Camp, 204 S.E.2d 465,465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (denying punitive damages for a carpenter's breach of contract
since the homeowner's cause of action arose from a contract, rather than from a tort); White v. Benkowski, 155
N.W.2d 74,77 (Wis. 1967) (disallowing award of punitive damages for the defendant's willful denial of the
plaintiff's rightful use of a water supply).
Several other authorities similarly agree that punitive damages are generally not among the available
remedies to plaintiffs in contract actions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979) (prohibiting
punitive damages for a breach of contract "unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which
punitive damages are recoverable"); 25 CJ.S. Damages § 120 (1955) (prohibiting exemplary damages, also
known as punitive damages (BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990)) for breach of contract, but
allowing them "in tort cases incidentally involving a contract where the requisite aggravating circumstances
are present"); 5 ARTHUR L. CORBiN, CORBiN ON CONTRACTS § 1077 (1950) (asserting that punitive damages
are not recoverable for a breach of contract, but a certain class of cases allows them when elements are present
that fall "within the field of tort or as closely analogous thereto"); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E.
JAEGER, A TREATISE ONTHE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1340 (3d ed. 1968) (restating the general rule that punitive
damages are unavailable as a remedy for contract breach except in certain instances involving wanton behavior
by public utilities or marriage promisors); see U.C.C. § 1-106(l) (1990) (forbidding punitive damages unless
otherwise provided by law).
11. CAL CIrv. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1996); see Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 405,303 P.2d
1029, 1033 (1956) (denying the plaintiff, a buyer, punitive damages even though the defendant, a real estate
broker with whom the plaintiff shared a fiduciary relationship, covertly received extra profits from the
transaction); Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 482, 486-87, 196 P.2d 915, 916, 918-19 (1948) (reversing a
punitive damages award against a mortician who intentionally promised the plaintiff that the defendant would
embalm the body of the plaintiff's deceased mother so that it would "keep almost forever," and that the
defendant would provide a hermetically sealed casket, although evidence showed that the defendant-mortician
never had any intention of fulfilling these promises and knew that such promises were impossible to fulfill).
The courts have historically permitted punitive damages in actions based upon tort, however, since one
goal of tort law is deterrence of unfavorable, injurious conduct. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306
(1992) (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363,371 (1852)) (noting that "[i]t is a well-established principle
of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon defendant, having in view the enormity of his offense
rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff"); see also J. Clark Kelso, Sixty Years of Torts: Lessons
for the Future, 29 TORT & INS. LJ. 1, 4-5 (1993) [hereinafter Sixty Years of Torts] (calling compensation and
deterrence the "twin pillars of tort law," and explaining that courts have experienced difficulty in achieving
the proper balance of the two). Punitive damages make an example of a particular defendant's conduct that the
law disfavors, thus achieving the deterrence goal of tort law. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 & n.21 (5th ed. 1984). Punitive damages may be awarded in tort cases only
when the defendant's conduct is particularly egregious, outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, or evil. Id. at 9-10.
See generally CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(a), (c)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1996).
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by
way of punishing the defendant.
"Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of
the rights or safety of others.
"Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person's rights.
"Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known
to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
Id.
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contract law.
The first rationale promulgated by the court is the importance of promoting
certainty and predictability regarding the costs of transacting commercial business
by way of legal contracts.12 Punitive damages, after all, introduce an element of
speculation into the parties' transaction because the assessment of punitive
damages is usually left to the jury's discretion and is, therefore, inherently
uncertain; they are also often inexplicably larger than compensatory damages. 13
The second rationale expressed by the court for prohibiting punitive damages
in contract actions is that damages are awarded to plaintiffs in breach of contract
actions only to compensate them for failed expectations, rather than to punish the
breaching party. 4 The whole idea of contract law is to compensate parties for
12. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683,765 P.2d 373, 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227
(1988).
13. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42,50 & n.14 (1979) (noting that the
broad discretion accorded to juries both as to the imposition and amount of punitive damages makes their
awards unpredictable, and the inappropriate passion or prejudice of juries toward unions, management, or
minority views may find its expression in punitive damages awards); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974) (asserting that jury discretion in awarding punitive damages is tempered only by "the gentle
rule that they not be excessive," that juries' assessments of this kind of damages are unpredictable because they
often bear no relation to the harm caused by defendant, and that juries may "use their discretion selectively to
punish expressions of unpopular views"); KEtMN E AL., supra note 11, § 2, at 11-12 & n.49 (describing how
punitive damages are awarded in civil cases without the procedural safeguards found in criminal cases, such
as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the double jeopardy rule,
since, except in Indiana, these defendants can be reprosecuted for a crime even though they may have already
been found guilty in a tort action and paid punitive damages); see also Rosener v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 110
Cal. App. 3d 740, 762-63, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 250-51 (1980) (Elkington, J., concurring) (noting inexplicable
ratios of punitive to actual damages imposed by juries, and calling punitive damages "an immovable and
treacherous Sword of Damocles" imposed by "perhaps the misguided verdict of a jury"). See generally
Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV.
269 (1983) (noting an increase in size and frequency of punitive damages awards, urging a reassessment of the
utility of punitive damages remedies, recognizing arbitrariness and prejudice inherent in many punitive
damages verdicts, and concluding that current procedures prevalent in awarding punitive damages are con-
stitutionally inadequate). But see JOHN W. WADE Er AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTs 531 (9th ed. 1994) (describing the benefits of punitive damages as follows: a salutory
method of discouraging bad or evil motives, a remedy for the unfortunate American rule of civil procedure that
attorney's fees are generally not recoverable against the defendant, a channeling device since plaintiff's desire
for revenge is brought through peaceful channels, and an incentive to try a long array of petty cases of outrage
and oppression, which prosecutors do not have time to pursue and private litigants would otherwise find
inconvenient).
Just recently, the Supreme Court has finally gotten around to creating a legal mechanism that will
hopefully offer some control over the often inexplicably large size of punitive damages awards. Its effective-
ness, of course, remains to be seen. See BMW, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-1603 (1996) (providing
three "guideposts" for a court to determine whether a punitive damages award comports with the Supreme
Court's notion of constitutional fairness whereby a person must receive fair notice of the conduct that will
subject the actor to punishment and of the severity of the penalty that states may impose: (1) The degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio between the plaintiff's compensatory damages and
the amount of punitive damages; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages award and the civil or
criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable misconduct).
14. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 683, 765 P.2d at 389,254 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (emphasis added).
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reasonable reliance on the promises of others. t5 Punitive damages are given,
however, to punish parties for behavior that society deems contemptuous, and to
deter others from acting similarly. 16 Punishment and deterrence serve more of a
purpose in the criminal law, where the law seeks to vindicate the interests of the
public at large rather than those between individual parties.' 7 In this sense, puni-
tive damages are inconsistent with the goal of contract remedies-individual
compensation for failed expectations. Professor Corbin stated the reason for the
lack of recoverability of punitive damages for contract breach another way:
"Breaches of contract... do not in general cause as much resentment or other
mental and physical discomfort as do the wrongs called torts and crimes.' '" 8
For these reasons, punitive damages have usually been unavailable as a
remedy for the breach of a contract. Instead they have remained primarily a
creature of tort remedies. In certain tort cases, and even a few contract cases, such
as those about to be discussed, punishment and deterrence of a defendant's
wrongful behavior, however, are remedies the law seeks to advance.
B. The Exception Allowing Punitive and Other Tort Damages in Insurance
Contract Cases
Of course, there are always exceptions to rules. Prior to Seaman's, California
courts made one notable exception to the rule denying punitive damages awards
in contract cases: cases involving insurance contracts.' 9
15. See infra note 245 and accompanying text (describing this goal as one of the chief purposes of
contract law).
16. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,306 n.9 (1986); Adams v. Murakami,
54 Cal. 3d 105, 110, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350,284 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320 (1991); RESTAT ENT (SECOND) OFTORTS
§ 908(1) (1979); KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, § 2. at 9 & n.21.
17. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 11, § 2, at 7 (describing the purpose of a criminal prosecution as
vindication of the interests of the public as a whole, whereas a civil tort action is designed to compensate an
individual for damages suffered at the hands of certain defendants); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScotT,
JR., StJsrANnrvECIuMINAL LAw §§ 1.3(b), 1.5, at 17,30-40(1986) (differentiating criminal law, with its aim
toward protection of the public against harm, from tort law, with its emphasis on the conflicting interests of
individuals, and discussing the various theories of punishment advanced to serve the purpose of the criminal
law: to prevent certain undesirable conduct and thus to protect various interests of society); see also Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEIP. PROBS. 401, 402-04 (1958) (recognizing the
distinction between criminal and contract and tort law; that crimes constitute injuries to society in general,
whereas contract or tort actions are concerned with individuals; finding the distinction unhelpful; and calling
the method of the criminal law a series of "commands, formulated in general terms, telling people what they
must or must not do[:] ... [t]hey speak to members of the community.... in the community's behalf, with all
the power and prestige of the community behind them").
18. 5Cotamn, supra note 10, § 1077.
However valid these [punitive] policy objectives might be in respect to pure torts involving conduct
of an extraordinary and outrageous character, they have little relevance in the area of contract law,
where breaches of contract do not ordinarily engender as much resentment or mental or physical
discomfort as do torts of the former variety.
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 381 A.2d 16,22 (Md. 1977).
19. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.8, at 192-94.
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The landmark California case that gave birth to this exception is Communale
v. Traders & General Insurance Co.20 In Communale, the California Supreme
Court allowed monetary recovery against an insurer in excess of its contractually-
obligated amount under the insurance policy.2 The court reasoned that the in-
surance company wrongfully declined to defend its insured because the insurance
policy contract expressly obligated the insurance company to provide for the
insured's representation if a personal injury action was brought against the
insured.22 Further, the insurance company refused a reasonable settlement offer
well within policy limits, knowing that a judgment well in excess of those policy
limits would most likely be rendered against the insured if settlement failed. 3
Although the court did not call the recovery punitive damages, it recognized that,
under traditional contract theory, recovery would be limited to the amount of the
policy.24 The court disagreed with the conventional view, instead, permitting
recovery beyond the contractually-obligated policy amount.a The high court's
rationale for allowing recovery was its position that the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied by law in every contract 26 requires an insurer to consider
the interest of its insured at least as much as its own interests when deciding
whether a claim should be compromised.27 This consideration in turn requires the
insurer to settle a claim against its insured if the settlement is within policy limits
and there is great risk of recovery beyond those policy limits.28
Communale was a third-party case. The third party, an injured person, re-
covered against the responsible party's insurer. However, the court was quick to
20. 50 Cal. 2d 654,328 P.2d 198 (1958).
21. Communale, 50 Cal. 2d at 661,328 P.2d at 202. Contra State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Skaggs,
251 F.2d 356,359-60 (10th Cir. 1957) (holding that an insurer who breaches its contract by refusing to defend
an action brought against its insured for a covered accident and who wrongfully denies coverage is liable only
to the extent of the insurer's liability under the policy limits); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329,
330 (5th Cir. 1952) (refusing to attach tort liability to an insurer that failed to investigate an allegedly covered
accident and refused to defend a subsequent suit against its insured, even assuming that the insurer breached
its contract).
22. Communale, 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at 201.
23. Id. at 660-61, 328 P.2d at 202.
24. Id. at 659-60, 328 P.2d at 201.
25. Id. at 660-61, 328 P.2d at 201-02.
26. Implied in all contracts is an obligation of "good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do
anything which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Brown v. Superior
Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949); accord CAL. COM. CODE § 1203 (West 1964); U.C.C.
§ 1-203 (1990); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTcrCrs § 205 (1979). The covenant often serves as a basis
for the provision of certain rights under commercial law, such as a seller's right to cure a defective delivery
of goods to a buyer. E.g. CAL. COM. CODE § 2508 (West 1964); U.C.C. § 2-508 (1990). The good faith and
fair dealing requirement, however, serves only to assist courts in interpreting rights and remedies. It is thus
not an independent cause of action by which a plaintiff can recover separate damages for its breach. U.C.C.
§ 1-203 cmt. (1990) (emphasis added).
27. Communale, 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
28. Id.
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apply the tortious breach of the implied covenant theory29 to first-party cases, in
which the insured sues its insurer. The seminal case in the first-party context is
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 30 in which the high court awarded mental
suffering damages for an insurer's wrongful refusal to settle.3' In Crisci, the
plaintiff owned an apartment building on which she carried a $10,000 general
liability policy issued by the defendant. A tenant on the property fell when the
wooden staircase she was descending collapsed. The tenant sued Crisci for negli-
gence. The defendant insurance company, pursuant to the policy, retained counsel
to represent its insured, plaintiff Crisci. The tenant's suit requested damages of
$400,000, but Crisci's counsel anticipated that, realistically, a verdict of $100,000
could probably be rendered against Crisci. The tenant made reasonable settlement
offers, one for $10,000 and another for $9000, and, at this point, Crisci herself
even offered to pay $2500 toward a $9000 settlement. The insurance company
refused to settle for more than $3000, the insurer let the action go to trial, and the
jury awarded a total of $101,000 against Crisci. In Crisci's subsequent action
against her insurer, she sued for $91,000, the entire judgment against her less the
$10,000 the insurer paid from the policy. Mrs. Crisci won, even though the
contractual policy limits were only $10,000.32 The court further sustained Crisci's
29. Courts and commentators alike seem to use the terms tortious breach of contract and bad faith
breach of contract interchangeably to describe the availability of tort remedies for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implied in all contracts. See James H. Cook, Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a
Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L. REV. 893, 894 n.12 (1986) (deciding to refer to tortious
breach of contract as bad faith breach, and noting that varying terms have been used by different courts at
different times to refer to the same tort theory of bad faith breach of contract); Susan D. Gresham, Note, "Bad
Faith Breach": A New and Growing Concern for Financial Institutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 891, 892 & n.5
(1989) (naming jurisdictions that followed California's lead in allowing tort recovery for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts, and noting that tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been referred to under various labels, including bad faith breach
and the tort of bad faith); see also supra note 26 (defining the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied
in all contracts). Ms. Gresham stated succinctly the evolution of the tortious breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing theory:
A majority of courts have determined that all contracts impose on the parties to the contract an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in their actions with each other. This implied
covenant prohibits a contracting party from injuring another party's right to receive the benefits of
the agreement. Breach of this implied covenant usually creates a cause of action based on contract
rights. Moreover, California courts maintain that breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing creates a tort action as well. The California courts initially limited these tort actions to
claims against insurance companies. Other states have followed California in allowing tort recovery
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts. The
imposition of tort liability in contract suits has allowed courts to award the injured party all
damages proximately caused by breach of the contract, as well as punitive damages.
Gresham, supra, at 891-92.
30. 66 Cal. 2d 425,432-33 & n.3, 426 P.2d 173, 178 & n.3, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 & n.3 (1967).
31. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at425,426 P.2d at 173,58 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
32. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179,58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The court relied heavily on Communale. Crisci,
66 Cal.2d at 429-32, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
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mental suffering damages of $25,000, finding tort remedies appropriate since an
action for wrongful refusal to settle sounds in both contract and tort.33 The court
stated that if Mrs. Crisci elected the contract remedy, the mental suffering
damages could be sustained by relying on the line of cases permitting mental
suffering damages for breach of contracts directly concerning the comfort, happi-
ness, or personal esteem of one of the parties?4 If Mrs. Crisci elected the tort
remedy, the court noted that it had long permitted mental suffering damages for
actions based upon tort.35
Another subsequent first-party insurance case that expanded tort remedies in
the insurance contract context is Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance
Co.36 The plaintiff purchased from the defendant a disability insurance policy that
provided monthly payments for two years in the case of sickness and thirty years
in the case of injury in the event of the plaintiff's total disability. 7 All physicians
examining the plaintiff agreed that he suffered permanent injury due to an on-the-
job accident about two years after he obtained the disability policy. Since the
disability insurance policy listed a hernia as a sickness, the defendant used one of
the plaintiff's medical reports listing a hernia as a related injury to the accident,
in order to pay the plaintiff under the sickness provision rather than the disability
provision. Under the policy, the defendant would only have to pay the plaintiff
33. Crisci, 66 Cal.2d at 432-33 & n.3, 426 P.2d at 178 & n.3, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 1 & n.3. The court also
found plaintiff's mental suffering damages award analogous to its line of cases permitting mental suffering
recovery for invasion of property rights rather than personal rights. Id. at 432-33,426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 18. Mrs. Crisci, as a result of the original award against her and in partial fulfillment of the judgment against
her, assigned 40% of her interest in a piece of property to the tenant who sued her. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176,
58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. See generally Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 337-38, 353 P.2d 294,299-300,
5 Cal. Rptr. 686, 691-92 (1960) (allowing mental suffering damages for defendant's malicious failure to abide
by prior agreement to supply plaintiff with water essential to use of his land); Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil
Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 271-75, 288 P.2d 507, 511-13 (1955) (permitting damages for discomfort and annoyance
because defendant's cotton gin operation constituted a nuisance and caused plaintiffs injury to their homes and
furniture); Herzog v. Grosso, 41 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26, 259 P.2d 429, 433-34 (1953) (sustaining plaintiffs'
damages for annoyance and discomfort due to defendant's blocking the road to plaintiffs' property).
34. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 434,426 P.2d at 179,58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The court cited Chelini v. Nieri, 32
Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948), as representative of its line of cases permitting mental suffering damages
for breach of a personal comfort contract. See supra note 11 (citing Chelin0; infra note 269 (same). Chelini
actually authorizes damages for physical suffering or illness in such cases. Chelini, 32 Cal. 2d at 482, 196 P.2d
at 916. The Crisci court failed to state expressly whether mental suffering damages and damages for physical
suffering or illness are one and the same. The Chelini court reversed the plaintiff's award of punitive damages,
finding them unavailable for breach of contract. Chelini, 32 Cal. 2d at 486-87, 196 P.2d at 918-19. In any
event, the facts of the Chelini case, relating to a defendant-mortician's ill-advised promises to an emotional
plaintiff that the defendant could make the body of the plaintiff's deceased mother "keep almost forever,"
make it worth reading. Interestingly, the now famous Melvin M. Belli represented the plaintiff in Chelini.
35. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 433,426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19. The court cited several of its
own cases permitting mental suffering damages in tort actions based on either personal injuries or tortious
interference with property rights.
36. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
37. The foregoing and following facts of the Fletcher case are paraphrased from Fletcher, 10 Cal. App.
3d at 386-94, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83-88.
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for two years under the sickness provision, rather than thirty years under the
disability provision. Another related injury, which the accident exacerbated, was
the plaintiff's congenital back ailment. The plaintiff never realized he had this
pre-existing condition, so he failed to list it on the disability application. The
defendant further seized upon this to inform the plaintiff that he had made
misrepresentations upon the application. Accordingly, the defendant would now
contest the claim in its entirety, and would consider suing for restitution of the
payments paid to the plaintiff to date on the ground of this misrepresentation.
However, the defendant offered to allow the plaintiff, in exchange for canceling
the policy and releasing defendant from the contract, to retain the payments the
plaintiff had already received, without receipt of any further benefits. The
plaintiff declined the offer and sued instead. The court relied on Crisci to uphold
the plaintiff's punitive damages award for the insurer's unjustified refusal to pay
the disability insurance claim.3" The court reiterated that the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing requires an insurer to act reasonably and in good faith
to settle claims. The Fletcher court reasoned that:
The violation of that duty sounds in tort notwithstanding that it may also
constitute a breach of contract .... We think that.., the implied-in-law
duty of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a
duty not to threaten to withhold or actually withhold payments,
maliciously and without probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its
insured by depriving him of the benefits of the policy.39
Three years later, in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company,40 the California
Supreme Court granted mental distress damages against an insurer that en-
couraged the filing of criminal charges against its insured who made a claim on
a fire policy; the insurer falsely implied that the insured may have committed
arson since he had excessive coverage under his fire insurance policies.4! ' The
insurer further manipulated its right to an examination of its insured, Mr.
Gruenberg, by timing the examination during the pendency of the criminal
charges against the insured, correctly suspecting that, having to deal with the
criminal charges, its insured would not show up for the examination, and then
used the failure to appear as a pretense for denying the claim. 42 The court justified
its holding by relying on Communale and Crisci, reasoning that the insurer had
38. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
39. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (citing Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 432-34, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 18-19).
40. 9 Cal. 3d 566,510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
41. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 570,510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
42. Id. at 570-71, 510 P.2d at 1034-35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
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breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured and was thus
liable in tort.43
Similarly, the court allowed tort remedies in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Company,44 in which a punitive damages award against a disability
insurer was approved on appeal, albeit reversed for being too excessive, after a
finding that the insurer had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.45 There, the insurance adjuster called the plaintiff a fraud, told him that
he was claiming disability only to avoid working, and advised the plaintiff that
the insurer's prior payments to him were unwarranted, and that the plaintiff would
not receive them any longer, despite the plaintiff's legitimate claim due to a bona
fide, substantiated injury.46 Further, irrespective of the plaintiff's valid claim, the
insurer offered a final settlement check to the plaintiff if he would agree to
surrender the policy.47 These actions were sufficient to constitute a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and to subject the insurer to
punitive damages liability in excess of its original, contractually-obligated amount
of liability.
48
Several rationales emerge that justify awarding punitive and other tort
damages in the insurance line of cases. One rationale is the special relationship
between the insurer and the insured.4 9 This special relationship, along with the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, require the insurer to act with decency
and humanity.50 Another rationale is the fact that insurance contracts are largely
contracts of adhesion;"' the relationship between the insurer and insured is
43. Id. at 575,510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
44. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 160 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979).
45. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 823, 620 P.2d at 148, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
46. Id. at 821,620 P.2d at 147, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
47. Id. at 822, 620 P.2d at 147, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
48. Id. at 819, 823, 620 P.2d at 146, 148, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696, 698.
49. Id. at 820,620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696. Several factors culminate to constitute this special
relationship: for example, the insurance company is in a superior bargaining position since it dictates the terms
of its insurance contracts, with the insured merely "signing upon the dotted line;" the insured's position is
further weakened by the fact that the individual is obtaining a necessary service or product, which is often
compulsory under state motor vehicle law; and the insurer is essentially a fiduciary since the insured places
its trust and confidence in the insurer, who agrees to be responsible for the insured's accidents. See Foley, 47
Cal. 3d at 690,765 P.2d at 394,254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33 (citing Charles M. Louderback & Thomas W. Jurika,
Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 227 (1982))
(recounting these aspects of the special relationship).
50. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820,620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (quoting William M. Goodman &
Thom G. Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the California
Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REV. 309, 346-47 (1974)).
51. California courts define a contract of adhesion as "a standardized contract, which, imposed and
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or reject it." Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (1961) (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 629 (1943)). While adhesion contracts are not per se illegal, since, after all, "[m]ost
contracts which govern our daily lives are of a standardized character," courts usually scrutinize them because
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inherently unbalanced and the insurer is in an automatically superior bargaining
position. Also of note is the fact that the weaker party to the contract, the
insured, enters into the contract not to make a profit, but rather to obtain a
necessary service or product: financial security or peace of mind 3 In light of
these rationales, punitive damages serve their deterrent effect by requiring
insurers not to take advantage of their insureds and to act in good faith with their
insureds, or else risk exposure to punitive damages liability. 4Although expansion
of the punitive remedy in the contractual setting seemed plausible,55 punitive
damages remedies remained unavailable outside the insurance context, until
Seaman's.
C. A Tort Is Born
The tough economic times56 surrounding the transactions underlying
Seaman's caused plaintiff's request for punitive damages for breach of a non-
insurance contract to fall on sympathetic ears. In 1971, Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. (Seaman's), sought to lease a part of a new marina that the City of
Eureka (City) had just built to operate a marine fuel dealership. 7 However, before
the City would approve the lease, it pressured Seaman's, for bonding purposes,
to secure evidence of a binding agreement with an oil supplier that would provide
the necessary fuel. Seaman's consulted Standard Oil Company of California
they stand theoretically opposite to our "freedom in bargaining and equality of bargaining which are the
theoretical parents of the American law of contracts." Neal, 188 Cal. App. 2d at 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784; see
Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 974, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174 (1975) (stating that "[t]he use
of standardized or mass-produced agreements containing a profusion of provisions which allow the stronger
party to dictate the terms to the weaker party is viewed with judicial concern").
52. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
53. Id. at 819, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696; Louderback & Jurika, supra note 49, at 227.
54. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of punitive damages as
punishment for behavior society deems contemptuous and as deterrence of such behavior by others in the
future).
55. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980) (inferring that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in employment
contracts might give rise to tort remedies if breached).
56. See Transcript of President Nixon's November 7 National Television Address on Nation's Energy
Crisis and Oil Shortage, N.Y. TOM, Nov. 8, 1973, at 32 (detailing numerous aspects of the nation's then
energy crisis: the Middle East oil producers cut off petroleum shipments to the United States; the oil supply
fell 10% to 17% short of the winter's anticipated demand; the reduction of heat in homes, offices, factories,
and commercial establishments became necessary; proposals existed to reduce domestic airline flights by 10%;
efforts were made to prevent industries and utilities from converting from coal to oil; highway speed limits
were reduced; a need existed for faster licensing and construction of nuclear power plants; a proposal suggested
staggering working hours to encourage use of public transportation and car pools; there was a general
recognition of a long-term and current energy shortage; and an executive order reduced temperatures in all
federal government offices to no more than 68 degrees).
57. The foregoing and following facts of the Seaman's case are paraphrased from Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,759-62, 686 P.2d 1158, 1160-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356-58
(1984).
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(Standard) for this purpose. After preliminary negotiations with Standard,
Seaman's explained the City's insistence on evidence of a written agreement and
requested Standard to prepare something to show the City. Standard responded
with a letter of intent that explicitly provided that the terms were not binding.
Since Seaman's needed to show the City a binding commitment, further nego-
tiations with Standard ensued and culminated in another letter of intent prepared
by Standard in 1972. This letter of intent contained language that the agreement
between Seaman's and Standard was conditioned upon mutual satisfaction with
the specific wording of the final contract, endorsement by the appropriate govern-
ment agencies, and continued approval of the credit status of Seaman's. Seaman's
presented this letter to the City, the City approved the letter as sufficiently
binding, and Seaman's and the City entered into a forty-year lease.
Due to market fluctuations in the oil industry and what eventually came to be
known as the oil crisis of the 1970s, 8 Seaman's and Standard never executed the
final contract contemplated by the second letter of intent.5 9 A federal program
designed to control the crisis went into effect in late 1973 and mandated
allocation of petroleum products among existing consumers. Standard then
informed Seaman's that Standard could no longer supply Seaman's with fuel,
since the federal regulations required suppliers to supply only those purchasers
to whom they sold petroleum products during the base period of 1972, a criterion
Seaman's did not meet. Standard contended this was the only bar to its continuing
to do business with Seaman's.
Seaman's successfully petitioned the federal government in early 1974 to
allow Standard to supply Seaman's with fuel. Standard responded by changing
position, denying that it had ever reached a binding agreement with Seaman's,
and appealing the government's decision because Standard did not want to take
on any new business. Communications between Standard and Seaman's grew
adverse. Standard was successful on its appeal of the federal government's order
in Seaman's favor.
Seaman's then appealed the government order again and won on the con-
dition that it file a court decree with the federal government to the effect that a
valid contract existed between Standard and Seaman's under state law. Seaman's
asked Standard to stipulate to the existence of a contract since it could not afford
a trial on the matter. The Standard representative responded by laughing and
saying "see you in court." 6
58. See supra note 56 (describing the crisis).
59. However, in 1973, Standard did execute a temporary marine dealership agreement to supply
Seaman's with the fuel necessary to run its station while the new marina remained under construction.
Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 761, 686 P.2d at 1162,206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
60. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358. The Seaman's court characterized this
expression as "adopting a 'stonewall' position" in its opinion. Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167,206 Cal. Rptr.
at 363. The Court of Appeal subsequently defined "stonewalling" as the "unreasonable denial of liability
without a substantial defense" Okun v. Morton, 203 Cal. App. 3d 805, 824,250 Cal. Rptr. 220,232 (1988).
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Seaman's ceased operations in early 1975 and thereafter sued Standard.
Seaman's alleged breach of contract, fraud, tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with the
contractual relationship of Seaman's with the City. Seaman's recovered on all but
the fraud theory.61 It received compensatory damages for breach of contract,
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship. The jury
awarded Seaman's punitive damages on both the tortious breach of the implied
covenant and intentional interference with contractual relations counts. Although
Seaman's consented to a remittitur6 2 for excessive punitive damages, Standard
appealed.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the action for breach of contract, but
reversed the tortious breach of the implied covenant and the intentional inter-
ference with an advantageous business relationship causes of action due to
erroneously prejudicial jury instructions.63 The thrust of the appeal was "whether,
and under what circumstances, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in a commercial contract may give rise to an action in tort." 64 The
court knew it was treading on new ground since it was dealing with a commercial
rather than an insurance contract,65 but the high court asserted that it was
unnecessary to decide the broad question posed by the thrust of the appeal. 6
Instead, the state high court merely declared that "[ilt is sufficient to recognize
that a party to a contract may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching
61. Seaman's declined to appeal the fraud cause of action, limiting its cross-appeal to only the merits
of the trial court's order reducing the amount of punitive damages awarded. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 774 n. 11,
686 P.2d at 1170 n.1 1,206 Cal. Rptr. at 366 n.l 1.
62. The term "remittitur" refers to "[t]he procedural process by which an excessive verdict of the jury
is reduced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990). Remittiturs are authorized in California by statute.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 666 (West 1987).
63. The court affirmed the breach of contract cause of action after finding Standard's statute of frauds
defense without merit. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 762-66, 686 P.2d at 1162-64, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358-60. The
court then held that the intent element of the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires
that a defendant's intentional acts of purposeful design disrupt the contractual relationship. Id. at 766, 686 P.2d
at 1164-65, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61. The high court reversed this cause of action because it found that the trial
court's instruction, that the intent element could be satisfied if defendant knew that interference with the
contractual relationship was substantially certain to result from its conduct, failed to comply with the proper
definition of intent for this tort: the defendant must intentionally act with purposeful design to disrupt the
contractual relationship. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1165-66, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62. Finally, on the tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing count, the court held that recovery could only be
found if Standard denied the existence of its contract with Seaman's in bad faith; since the trial court's charge
failed to specify that the denial must be in bad faith, the high court reversed for further proceedings consistent
with its decision. Id. at 767-74, 686 P.2d at 1166-70, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-66 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1166,206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
65. Id. at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67,206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
66. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167,206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
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the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and
without probable cause, that the contract exists.
' 67
Hence, the Seaman's tort was born, seemingly out of thin air, 68since the court
failed to rely on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory in
establishing the tort. Little did the California Supreme Court know that its new
tort would lead a short and tumultuous life. Had the court relied on the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the basis for tort liability, perhaps its
new tort would have lived longer, because courts would then have had a
framework within which to apply the new tort.
D. The Fatal Flaw of Seaman's
It was evident from the Seaman's decision that the new tort theory of liability
would pose difficulty in its application to ordinary commercial contract cases.
The major problem, which proved to be the fatal flaw of Seaman's, was the
court's failure to rely on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
theory as its rationale for applying tort remedies in commercial contract settings.
Use of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a basis for tort
liability proved successful in its insurance contract line of cases.69 So too would
it probably have been in the Seaman's line of cases.
Chief Justice Rose Bird recognized the flaw immediately by way of her
dissent from the part of the court's opinion creating the new tort.70 Although the
ultimate disposition of the case was faulty, under either the majority or the con-
curring and dissenting opinion, at least the Chief Justice realized the anomaly of
allowing a tort remedy for denial of existence of a contract without providing a
solid framework by which to apply this remedy.7' Courts would need a test to
67. Id.
68. Economics may help to explain the reason for the court's sudden inclination to expand tort remedies
for contract plaintiffs. While the actual controversy underlying Seaman's occurred during the tougher economic
days of the early 1970s oil crisis, see supra note 56 for a description of the crisis, the high court decided
Seaman's in better economic times: the 1980s, the decade of "greed." Courts are much more willing to expand
tort liability during better economic times on the theory that business and industry can absorb new costs by
distributing them through insurance and price increases. However, during more difficult economic periods,
such as 1995, the year of Freeman & Mills and slow economic recovery from a late 1980s-early 1990s
recession, courts restrict tort liability because business and industry may suffer and be unable to absorb any
new costs of doing business. See Sixty Years of Torts, supra note 11, at 8 (asserting that during "times of
plenty," courts ignore industry complaints that tort liability is too burdensome, but during "periods of recession
or very slow growth," courts are more likely to respond to business complaints by restricting tort liability).
69. See supra notes 19-55 and accompanying text (discussing the insurance contract line of cases).
70. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 775, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
71. See id. (stating that the majority opinion in Seaman's "refuses to acknowledge that its holding is
compelled by this court's past decisions analyzing the scope of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing"). This clash between the majority and concurring and dissenting opinions is undoubtedly to what the
Lucas court refers in its majority opinion in Freeman & Mills when it states "[s]ubsequent opinions of this
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determine how to apply the tort, such as utilizing the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing theory as a basis of liability, and recognizing that a breach
of contract could constitute a tortious breach of the implied covenant under
certain circumstances.72 Without such a theory to apply the Seaman's tort, lower
courts would be confused, and history proved this to be the case.73
The Chief Justice's dissent, however, would be only the first of many
criticisms of the court's analysis in Seaman's. Since the other criticisms leading
up to Freeman & Mills are addressed at length in the Freeman & Mills opinion
itself, it is helpful to consider the criticisms of Seaman's as they are discussed in
Freeman & Mills.
I. THE DEATH OF SEAMAN'S
A. The Facts of Freeman & Mills74
Defendant Belcher Oil Company (Belcher) retained a law firm, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius (Morgan), to represent its interests in a lawsuit in Florida.
Morgan then retained an accounting firm, plaintiff Freeman & Mills, Inc.
(Freeman & Mills), to provide financial analysis and litigation support for the
suit, after obtaining Belcher's authorization through its general counsel. Belcher
was to pay for costs incurred on its behalf, including fees for accountants, pur-
suant to a letter of understanding executed by Belcher's general counsel and a
Morgan partner.
Subsequently, general counsel for Belcher, with whom the Morgan partner
had dealt, left Belcher, and was replaced. Belcher thereafter became dissatisfied
with Morgan's representation and fired the firm, requesting summaries of both'
its work and Freeman & Mills's work. Belcher ultimately refused to pay both
Morgan and Freeman & Mills, claiming Belcher was not consulted about the
extent of Freeman & Mills's services. Belcher suggested to Freeman & Mills that
it look to Morgan for payment.
court indicate a continuing reluctance, originally reflected in Seaman's itself, to authorize tort recovery for
noninsurance contract breaches." Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 11 Cal. 4th 85, 93, 900 P.2d 669,
674, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 425 (1995) (emphasis added).
72. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 775, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). Chief Justice Bird applied the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory to reason that
Standard violated the good faith and fair dealing requirement by attempting to avoid all liability for a contract
breach by denying, in bad faith, the very existence of the contract, which "violates the nearly universal
expectation that the injured party will be compensated for losses caused by the breaching party's failure to
perform"). For a discussion of expectation damages, see infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text (describing
expectation damages theory).
73. See infra notes 115-46 and accompanying text (discussing the various Court of Appeals opinions
that interpreted the Seaman's opinion, and noting the confusion and inconsistency among them).
74. The following facts of the Freeman & Mills case are paraphrased from Freeman & Mills, I I Cal.
4th at 88-89, 900 P.2d at 670-71, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421-22.
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Freeman & Mills sued Belcher, alleging causes of action for breach of con-
tract, "bad faith denial of contract," and quantum meruit. 5 The jury returned a
verdict for Freeman & Mills on the breach of contract count, and found that
Belcher had denied the existence of the contract in bad faith, and had acted with
fraud, oppression, or malice in so doing. The jury then awarded Freeman & Mills
$400,000 in punitive damages.
Belcher appealed the judgment in its entirety. The Court of Appeal reversed
on the bad faith denial of contract claim, finding an absence of the "special
relationship 76 it thought necessary between the parties to justify tort remedies
under Seaman S.77 In so doing, the appellate court suggested, "it is time for the
Supreme Court to re-examine the tort of 'bad faith denial of contract."' 78 The
California Supreme Court did exactly that, and overruled Seaman's in its decision
of August 31, 1995. The Seaman's tort is dead.
B. The Freeman & Mills Majority Opinion-An Assault on Seaman's
1. Seaman's and Stare Decisis
Using its signature Lucas methodology for overturning far-reaching Bird
court decisions,79 the Freeman & Mills majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
Malcolm Lucas, began by reviewing the court's holding in Seaman's.80 This
review consisted of a restatement of the facts of Seaman's, 81 and a lengthy quote
of the part of the opinion in which the court created the new tort.82
75. Id., I1 Cal. 4th at 89, 900 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422. The equitable doctrine of quantum
meruit, literally meaning "as much as deserved," provides the plaintiff with damages reasonably tantamount
to the amount of goods or services the plaintiff has provided the defendant, regardless of whether an express
contract exists. The plaintiff can usually recover quantum meruit damages in circumstances under which the
defendant would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefits accorded the defendant by the plaintiff's
material or labor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (6th ed. 1990).
76. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (defining the special relationship); infra notes 100, 127-
29, 149 and accompanying text (describing various court appraisals of the special relationship).
77. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 90,900 P.2d at 671,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422.
78. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 33 Cal. App. 4th 837, 840, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585, 586
(1994), a.'d, 11 Cal. 4th 85, 900 P.2d 669,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d420 (1995).
79. See Tribute, supra note 9 (discussing the Lucas approach to overruling prior decisions of the
California Supreme Court).
80. This part of the Freeman & Mills opinion is not discussed here since Seaman's has already been
addressed. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (recounting the facts of Seaman's).
82. The quoted portion is from Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,768-
70,686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354,362-63 (1984). See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text
(analyzing this part of the Seaman's decision).
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The court then addressed the doctrine of stare decisis. 83 It acknowledged that
"'[i]t is ... a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent
usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be
decided differently by the current justices. ' ''84 The court conceded that the
rationale behind the doctrine is the law's important goal of promoting certainty
and predictability so that parties can guide their conduct and relationships with
assurance of established rules of law.85
However, the court also averred that the doctrine of stare decisis does not
"'shield court-created error from correction.', 8 6 The court couched its decision
to re-examine Seaman's in terms of subsequent developments that indicated
Seaman's was decided incorrectly.87 The subsequent developments to which the
court refers are rejection and criticism of the Seaman's holding from all legal
comers.
83. Stare decisis literally means "[tlo abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S LAv DICTIONARY
1406 (6th ed. 1990). A well-respected authority on stare decisis offered an excellent description of the doctrine
this way:
A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge, made after full argument on a question of law
fairly arising in a case and necessary to its determination, is an authority or binding precedent in
the same court, or in other courts of equal or lower rank within the same jurisdiction, in subsequent
cases where the very point is again presented; but the degree of authority belonging to such a
precedent depends, of necessity, on its agreement with the spirit of the times or the judgment of
subsequent tribunals upon its correctness as a statement of the existing or actual law, and the
compulsion or exigency of the doctrine is, in the last analysis, moral and intellectual, rather than
arbitrary or inflexible.
Daniel H. Chamberlain, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis as Applied to Decisions of Constitutional Questions,
3 HARV. L. REV. 125, 125 (1889).
84. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 92,900 P.2d at 673,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 424 (quoting Moradi-Shalal
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 296, 758 P.2d 58, 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 121 (1988)); see
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (promulgating the following factors to be
considered in deciding whether to overrule precedent: (1) Whether the current rule is unworkable; (2) whether
the established precedent is relied upon to such an extent that its overruling would cause hardship; (3) whether
principles of law related to the existing doctrine have developed to the point of rendering it legally
insignificant; and (4) whether facts or circumstances have changed such that the rule no longer has vitality or
applicability).
One writer asserted that, indeed, "it is highly unlikely that [Seaman's] would be decided the same way
today." Landsdorf, supra note *, at 222.
85. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 93, 900 P.2d at 673, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 424 (quoting Moradi-
Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296,758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121); see Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854
(offering a prudential and pragmatic rationale for stare decisis, stating "that no judicial system could do
society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it," and asserting that the rule of law
contemplated by the Constitution requires continuity over time such that a respect for precedent is
indispensable with reference to the court's legitimacy).
86. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 93, 900 P.2d at 673, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 424 (quoting Cianci v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 924,710 P.2d 375, 388, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 587 (1985)).
87. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 93,900 P.2d at 673,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 424. The court cited People
v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1138, 742 P.2d 1306, 1327,240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 605 (1987), for the proposition
that subsequent developments, showing that a prior decision was unsound, require re-examination of precedent.
The court there overruled a prior decision holding that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special
circumstance in light of subsequent Supreme Court opinions expressing sentiments to the contrary. Id.
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2. Subsequent Developments: Rejection and Criticism of Seaman's
a. Supreme Court Decisions-Rejection of Seaman's
The high court began the thrust of its opinion by discussing its own opinions
subsequent to Seaman's that evinced reluctance to sanction tort remedies for non-
insurance contract s breaches.89 Notably, the court decided the opinions to which
it refers after Lucas assumed the helm of the Supreme Court. It comes as no
surprise that the Lucas Supreme Court will go down in history for its conservative
shift in ideology from its liberal predecessor, the Bird Supreme Court.90 The most
obvious decision that exemplified this shift is Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. ,91
written by Lucas, which the court reviewed only a year and a half after California
voters ousted former Chief Justice Rose Bird, which resulted in then-Governor
George Deukmejian appointing Malcolm Lucas as the new chief justice.92
88. Based upon the court's lack of discussion of the bad faith insurance contract cases, its recurring
references to "noninsurance" contracts in its analysis, and its repeated intimations about the ordinary
commercial setting in which Seaman's allowed tort recovery, punitive damages are clearly still allowed in bad
faith insurance contract cases. In fact, at the end of its opinion, the court stated "that nothing in this opinion
should be read as affecting the existing precedent governing enforcement of the implied covenant [of good faith
and fair dealing] in insurance cases." Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 431.
89. Id. at 93-95, 900 P.2d at 674-75,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425-26.
90. Undoubtedly, the conservative trend of the state high court is an unspoken "subsequent
development" that contributed to the death of Seaman's. As one writer put it, "Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas
will always be remembered for presiding over a conservative shift in California Supreme Court jurisprudence
following the liberal and controversial era of Chief Justice Rose Bird." Scott Graham, Lucas' Biggest Impact
Came Outside Courtroom; But Some Important Projects Remain 'Works in Progress' S.F. RECORDER, Oct.
3, 1995, at 1.
91. 47 Cal. 3d 654,765 P.2d 373,254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). Appellate courts recognized that Foley
had a significant impact on the state's tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Copesky v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 688,280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 344 (1991)
(stating that the "winds of change blew in 1988 with the publication of Foley," noting that only two of the
seven justices that decided Foley took part in Seaman's, and further noting that the court took an entirely new
approach to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after Seaman's, by emphasizing the difference
between contract and tort remedies, and asserting that normally only contract remedies are available for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 477-
78, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 740-41 (1989) (stating that the "evolution of the [tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing] law was dramatically upset last year by Foley... [; t]he impact of the
Foley decision cannot be assessed with certainty... [and tihe decision surely precludes the sort of loose
extension of tort recovery, based on 'quasi-fiduciary' relationship, sanctioned in [other earlier cases]").
92. See Claire Cooper, State High Court Chief Will Retire, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 1, 1995, at Al
(describing Lucas's ascension to the chief justice position). Former Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other then-
associate justices, Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin, failed to win "a bitterly contested and expensive 1986
election centering on voters' perception that the court had not enforced the death penalty sufficiently." Karl
Olson, Change and Constancy; Now Most Frequently a Liberal Dissenter Among Conservatives, Stanley
Mosk's Legacy Over 30 Years on the Supreme Court May Be Clouded, S.F. RECORDER, Aug. 17, 1994, at 6.
In fact, during the period from 1979 to 1986, the California Supreme Court reviewed 64 death penalty verdicts
and upheld only five of them. Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the Supreme Courts
of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 237, 237 (1989).
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The Freeman & Mills court noted its previous refusal in Foley to extend the
ordinary commercial contracts holding of Seaman's to employment contracts.
Foley involved an employment contract in which a discharged employee alleged
wrongful termination.93 The employee had informed his employer that the em-
ployee's supervisor was under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation for embezzlement from a former employer.94 Plaintiff, the employee,
alleged that the defendant, the employer, fired him for this reason, while the
defendant maintained that the termination resulted from the plaintiff's poor job
performance. 95 The Foley court declined the Seaman's invitation 96 to extend tort
remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts.9 7
In doing so, the court first paid homage to two essential tenets of contract
law: the importance of certainty and predictability about the cost of doing busi-
ness by way of legal contracts, and the traditional restriction of contract remedies
to compensate the aggrieved party rather than to punish the breaching one.?
These concepts provided the court with the impetus it needed to limit tort
remedies for contract breach. The Foley court then considered an attempted
analogy of employment contracts to insurance contracts to determine whether
employment contracts merited tort remedies for bad faith breach, as insurance
contracts had. 99 The court concluded that employment contracts do not have the
special relationship component that insurance contracts do, a factor the court had
emphasized in permitting tort remedies for bad faith breach of insurance con-
tracts. l ° The court reasoned that employment contracts are not contracts of
adhesion, since standardized forms are not always used and the employer often
does not dictate the contract's terms.' 0 ' Further, employees are usually not in as
disastrous a dilemma as insureds are if their employment contracts are breached,
since employees can look for other employment while insureds cannot find other
93. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 662,765 P.2d at 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
94. Id. at 664,765 P.2d at 375,254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
95. Id. at 664,765 P.2d at 375-76, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
96. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769 n.6, 686 P.2d 1158,
1166 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354,362 n.6 (1984) (reiterating its intimation in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980), that breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing might permit tort remedies, since the employer-employee
relationship "has some of the same characteristics as the relationship between insurer and insured"); see also
supra note 55 (recounting the Tameny footnote).
97. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693,765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
98. Id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227; see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text
(discussing the punishment goal of punitive damages, and its inconsistency with contract law's compensatory
goal).
99. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 690-93, 765 P.2d at 393-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-35; see supra notes 19-55
and accompanying text (discussing punitive damages and other tort Temedies for bad faith breach of an
insurance contract).
100. See supra notes 19-55 and accompanying text.
101. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 691,765 P.2d at 394,254 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
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insurers to pay for their already-sustained loss.'02 Thus, Foley marked the
beginning of a trend toward limiting tort recovery for bad faith contracting.
The Freeman & Mills majority then devoted two paragraphs to Hunter v. Up-
Right, Inc.,'03 a case involving employer misrepresentations' °4 made to induce
termination of employment. 05 The court there held that Foley precludes an award
of punitive damages in such a scenario.' °6 The Freeman & Mills majority thought
it significant that Hunter failed to mention Seaman's, noting that, "with the
exception of insurance contracts, remedies for breach of the implied covenant [of
good faith and fair dealing] 'have almost always been limited to contract
damages."1 07 The court further noted its reasoning in Hunter that the defendant's
misrepresentations were merely a means used to achieve an end to the contractual
relationship and that the Hunter court would not allow this to be used as a pre-
dicate for tort damages. 08 Again, the state high court had refused to allow tort
remedies for a bad faith breach of contract. Two concurring justices in Freeman
& Mills, however, would have a different opinion about the applicability of
Hunter.'9
The last California Supreme Court opinion that the Lucas court considered
is Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., tOin which the high court
held that a contracting party may not be held liable in tort for conspiring with
another to interfere with its own contract. The Freeman & Mills court noted its
rationale in Applied Equipment that commercial activity is fostered by limiting
contract remedies to damages reasonably foreseeable at the time of a contract's
execution."' This limitation is grounded in the notion that foreseeability of
contract damages for breach enable parties to gauge ahead of time the fiscal risk
of entering into the contract. 12 The court further noted its statement in Applied
Equipment that tort remedies for a breach of contract could be recovered only
when the breach constitutes a violation of some independent duty arising out of
tort law.'
102. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
103. 6 Cal. 4th 1174, 864 P.2d 88,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (1993).
104. A misrepresentation is a manifestation by words or conduct that constitutes an untrue assertion of
fact. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1001 (6th ed. 1990).
105. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 94, 900 P.2d at 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425.
106. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1185, 864 P.2d at 93, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13.
107. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 94, 900 P.2d at 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425 (quoting Hunter, 6 Cal.
4th at 1180, 864 P.2d at 90, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11).
108. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 94, 900 P.2d at 674, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425.
109. See infra notes 182-201 and accompanying text.
110. 7 Cal. 4th 503, 869 P.2d 454, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475 (1994).
111. Applied Equipment, 7 Cal. 4th at 515, 869 P.2d at 460, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481.
112. Id.
113. Id. For example, regardless of the promise that the promisor makes the promisee in a contract, the
law imposes on the promisor the general tort duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid physical harm to persons
and tangible things when acting to perform the promise. KEETON Er AL., supra note 11, § 92, at 657. Thus, the
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The Freeman & Mills majority believed that these opinions, Foley, Hunter,
and Applied Equipment, viewed cumulatively, stood for the proposition that
recovery of tort damages should be limited to insurance contract cases unless
some duty arises on the part of the defendant out of tort law. In such a scenario,
when the defendant breaches the contract, the defendant also breaches this tort
duty, and the plaintiff may recover tort remedies accordingly.
114
The high court thus concluded a review of its own recent decisions that
evinced reluctance to extend tort remedies for bad faith breach of contract. The
Freeman & Mills majority then turned to various Court of Appeal decisions
interpreting Seaman's.
b. Court of Appeal Decisions-More Rejection of Seaman's
The California Supreme Court, in Freeman & Mills, noted that the Court of
Appeal opinions evinced obvious confusion concerning the Seaman's holding. "5
It cited numerous appellate cases that raised important questions regarding the tort
of bad faith denial of contract." 6 For instance, one question that the lower courts
attempted to resolve was whether the Seaman's tort was based on a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or some other independent tort
duty.1 7 The Second District Court of Appeal, in Okun v. Morton,"t8 decided that
the tort was indeed based upon the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing," 9 while its sister court in the Fifth District, in Quigley v. Pet, Inc.,120 con-
cluded to the contrary. 'Another question that the appellate courts answered
inconsistently was whether the Seaman's tort encompassed bad faith denial of
liability under a contract, such as posing a defense in bad faith, as well as denial
of a contract's existence in bad faith.'2 The court in DuBarry International, Inc.
promisor is liable for both his promises imposed by the contract as well as any breach of this general tort duty
imposed by law in carrying out the promise. This independent tort duty exists in traditionally contractual
contexts such as a lawyer or an abstractor examining title to property, a doctor treating or diagnosing a patient,
an engineer surveying land, and a bill collector settling an account. Freeman & Mills, I 1 Cal. 4th at 106, 900
P.2d at 682, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); KEETON ET AL., supra, § 92, at 657.
114. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 95,900 P.2d at 675,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426.
115. See infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text (examining the appellate decisions).
116. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 96-97, 900 P.2d at 676,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427.
117. Id. at 96,900 P.2d at 676,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427. This Casenote maintains that the Seaman's court
did not rely on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory as the basis for its holding. This is
the "fatal flaw" of Seaman's. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
118. 203 Cal. App. 3d 805,250 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1988).
119. Okun, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 824,250 Cal. Rptr. at 232; accord Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal.
App. 3d 1155, 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829 (1986) (finding it "difficult otherwise to understand" the
Seaman's court's repeated references to "good faith" and "bad faith" if the court did not in fact find it necessary
to base its decision on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
120. 162 Cal. App. 3d 877,208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984).
121. Quigley, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 889, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
122. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 96, 900 P.2d at 676, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427.
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v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc."3 determined that Seaman's could only
extend to bad faith denial of a contract's existence, not a party's bad faith denial
of liability under a contract.' 24 Another appellate court, however, in Multiplex
Insurance Agency, Inc. v. California Life Insurance Co., 25 concluded that bad
faith denial of liability under a contract was enough for remedies under Seaman's
to attach. 26 Finally, another recurring, problematic question of which the
Freeman & Mills majority took notice was whether a "special relationship" bet-
ween the contracting parties, analogous to insurer and insured, was a necessary
element of the Seaman's tort.' 27 While both the Multiplex and Quigley courts
found a special relationship unnecessary to a Seaman's action, 128 the Okun court
ruled that a special relationship was a prerequisite to Seaman's liability.' 29
The Freeman & Mills court then pointed to policy reasons that these appellate
decisions underscored for abrogating Seaman's. 130 For example, the DuBarry
court, in holding that Seaman's did not apply to bad faith defenses to claims of
123. 231 Cal. App. 3d 552, 282 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1991).
124. DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 571,282 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
125. 189 Cal. App. 3d 925,235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1987).
126. Multiplex, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 939, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
127. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 97, 900 P.2d at 676, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427. Perhaps one reason
why the appellate courts applying Seaman's encountered such confusion over the special relationship question
is the fact that, after Seaman's, plaintiffs who were victims of bad faith commercial contract breach often
pleaded tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although the results were
mixed, and the cases were not technically Seaman's actions because the defendants breached in bad faith,
rather than denied in bad faith, their contracts, the Courts of Appeal focussed on the characteristics of the
relationship of the contracting parties in determining recovery, as had the Supreme Court in Seaman's and the
insurance line of cases. See Rogoff v. Grabowski, 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 630, 632-33, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189-
91 (1988) (declining to permit the plaintiff's tort remedy for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in an oral limousine rental contract, by emphasizing that the parties, a consumer and a driver with
a limousine, were not in unequal bargaining positions, since the plaintiff enjoyed access to and from the car
while the defendant partially performed the contract, and remanding to determine whether the plaintiff stated
a statutory cause of action under California Public Utilities Code § 5360, since the court found a reasonable
inference that the defendant was a carrier of persons for reward or a charter-party carrier of passengers); see
also Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,514, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551,554 (1985)
(upholding the plaintiffs cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing against the defendant-bank, who claimed nonexistent legal defenses to its negligent disbursement of
the Plaintiff's funds, by reasoning that the relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary); Wallis
v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129-30 (1984) (allowing recovery in tort
against an employer that breached its agreement to pay its employee severance pay on the ground that the
parties shared a relationship analogous to that of a disability insurer and insured). Of course, Foley rained on
the tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing parade. See Price v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 741 (1989) (stressing that a likely impact of Foley is to
quash further extension of tort recovery for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based
on "quasi-fiduciary relationship," similar to that of the bank and depositor in Commercial Cotton).
128. Multiplex, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 939, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 21; Quigley, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 401.
129. Okun, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
130. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 97-98, 900 P.2d at 676-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427-28.
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breach of contract,13' stated that, to rule otherwise, "any party attempting to
defend a disputed contract claim would risk... exposure to the imposition of tort
damages and an expensive and time-consuming expansion of the litigation into
an inquiry as to the motives and state of mind of the breaching party.' 32 This,
according to the DuBarry court, would be bad public policy because the line
between contract and tort, both as to actions and damages, would be blurred,
which would constitute a disservice to the goals served by contract and tort law
and "their purposefully different measures of damages." 3 3 Such a rule would also
upset the reliability of commercial transactions and would give more work to an
already overburdened court system.1
3 4
The Freeman & Mills majority also recognized other meritorious policy
reasons for overruling Seaman's that the court in Harris v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. 35 had expounded.136 In Harris, the plaintiff operated an AM/PM mini-market
under a franchise agreement with the Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO).t37 The
plaintiff alleged that ARCO failed to repair and renovate his store as promised in
retaliation for the plaintiffs failure to comply with ARCO's pricing policy, and
for his report to the authorities of an underground gasoline leak at the facility. The
plaintiff sued ARCO for breach of contract, tortious breach of contract in
violation of public policy, bad faith denial of contract, and fraud. The court
upheld the breach of contract action in the plaintiff's favor, upheld both the
tortious breach of contract in contravention of public policy and the bad faith
denial of contract claims against the plaintiff, and remanded on the fraud cause
of action. The Seaman's action was denied because the jury found there was no
consideration for the underlying contract that ARCO had allegedly denied. The
Harris court engaged in a thorough policy analysis, however, to decide whether
tortious breach of contract in violation of public policy should be extended
beyond the employer-employee relationship, which the Supreme Court had
sanctioned in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.'38 In declining the invitation to
131. DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 569,282 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
132. Id. This feature of the Seaman's tort runs counter to the fundamental tenet of contract law that the
objective standard governs whether a contract exists and, thus, its terms and their meaning. See, e.g., New York
Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Corp., 34 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1929); Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 521-
22 (Va. 1954).
133. DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 569, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
134. Id.
135. 14 Cal. App. 4th 70, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 (1993).
136. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 98, 900 P.2d at 676-77,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427-28.
137. The foregoing and following facts of the Harris case are paraphrased from Harris, 14 Cal. App.
4th at 72, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
138. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). Tameny, another Bird Court decision
that expanded tort liability, concerned a terminated employee's allegations against ARCO that it had
wrongfully fired him for refusing to participate in an illegal scheme to fix gasoline prices. Tameny, 27 Cal, 3d
at 169, 610 P.2d at 1330-31, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840. Although the trial court held that the plaintiff could not
recover in tort since only breach of an employment contract was at issue, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the employee could maintain the tort action on a wrongful discharge theory. Id. at 178-79, 610 P.2d at
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extend tort recovery for breach of contract in violation of public policy, the
Harris court pointed to the efficient breach theory as an important reason for
keeping contract and tort remedies separate, 39 since the efficient breach theory
is recognized in contract law but not in tort law. 140 The court further noted that the
goal of contract remedies, compensation of the aggrieved party, offers contracting
parties predictability of the consequences of actions, which promotes commercial
stability.' 4' The Harris court also underscored the potential of turning almost
every contract breach into a claim for punitive damages, which seems like an
unfair tool of coercion for plaintiffs. 42 Finally, the court concluded by stating its
preference for judicial restraint as another beneficial policy principle that militates
against making tort remedies available for the bad faith breach of a contract in
contravention of public policy. 143 The Harris court thought it more appropriate
to defer to the state legislature when it comes to making important policy judg-
ments affecting commercial relationships that dictate expansion of tort remedies
in contract law.' 44 The legislative forum provides the opportunity to collect
empirical evidence, unrestricted by evidentiary rules; the chance to solicit expert
advice; and the occasion to hold hearings in which all pertinent parties may be
heard and all issues may be fully debated. 45 Hence, the Freeman & Mills court
concluded its review of the cases interpreting Seaman's on this note, stating that
"the foregoing policy considerations fully support our decision to overrule
Seaman's rather than attempt to clarify its uncertain boundaries.' 46
1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The high court reasoned that tort recovery was appropriate in a situation in
which an employer essentially demanded that its employee commit criminal acts to further the employer's
interest, which the court found violated fundamental tenets of public policy. Id. at 173, 610 P.2d at 1333, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 842. The Tameny court declined to address the issue whether the employee could maintain an
action against the employer on a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory.
Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12; see supra note 55 (noting the court's
intimation in the Tameny footnote that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts might give rise to tort remedies if breached).
139. Harris, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 77, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653-54.
140. See infra notes 285-99 and accompanying text (discussing the efficient breach theory in contract
law); see also Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 106, 900 P.2d at 682, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (viewing the intentional breach of contract as a morally neutral act but the
intentional tort as a reprehensible act, since economics supports the idea that an intentional breach of contract
may create net benefits for society); RESTATIMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs, ch. 16 introductory note at 100
(1979) (describing contract law's acceptance of economically efficient, intentional breaches of contract).
141. Harris, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 81, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 656.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 81-82, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 656-57.
144. Id. at 82, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 656-57.
145. Id. at 82, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657.
146. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 98, 900 P.2d at 677, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428.
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c. Persuasive Authority-Criticism of Seaman's
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Freeman & Mills then looked at
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions that supported the overruling of
Seaman's.47 The court noted its position of almost complete solitude in having
recognized a tort cause of action for bad faith denial of a contract's existence.148
It described how, other than California, only Montana had recognized the tort,
and even then, that state had limited the tort to those situations in which the
contracting parties had a special relationship. 49
The majority then observed critical commentary directed at Seaman's by
colleagues on the federal bench.150 Most notably, Judge Kozinski of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made negative remarks about Cali-
fornia's newest tort in Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech International, Inc.5' The
distinguished federal jurist believed Seaman's to be flawed because he found the
distinction between bad faith denial of a contract and lawful denial of liability
under a contract impossible to make. 52 The only test Judge Kozinski could
extract from Seaman's to make this distinction was whether a defendant's con-
duct "'offends accepted notions of business ethics,"' which simply "gives judges
license to rely on their gut feelings in distinguishing between a squabble and a
tort."' 53 The Freeman & Mills court also took notice of Judge Kozinski's further
thought that Seaman's liability interfered with the business community's
important freedom to contract by injecting court-made business etiquette into the
law of contracts.I54 Judge Kozinski explained that it is "most troubling" that
courts subordinate parties' voluntary contractual arrangements to the court's own
sense of public policy and proper business decorum, which deprives parties of the
important right to adjust legal relationships freely by mutual agreement. 155
147. Id. at 98-102, 900 P.2d at 677-79, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428-30.
148. Id. at 98, 900 P.2d at 677,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428; see Landsdorf, supra note *, at 235 & n.182
(explaining that Montana was the only other state recognizing a Seaman's-type tort).
149. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 98, 900 P.2d at 677, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428 (citing Story v.
Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1990)); see supra notes 49, 76, 100, 127-29 and accompanying text
(discussing the special relationship concept).
150. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 99, 900 P.2d at 677, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428.
151. O16 Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1989).
152. Id. at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Indeed, Judge Kozinski's remarks are telling: "In inventing
the tort . . ., the California Supreme Court has created a cause of action so nebulous in outline and so
unpredictable in application that it more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window than a rule of
law." Id.
153. Id. (quoting Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167,206 Cal. Rptr. at 363).
154. OkiAmerica, 872 F.2d at 316 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
155. Id.
1430
1996/Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.
Finally, the court observed Judge Kozinski's ability to predict the future when he
concluded, "'Seaman's is a prime candidate for reconsideration.'
1 56
The majority proceeded to consider another federal judge's critical remarks
of Seaman's in Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., Ltd. 57 Circuit Judge
Hall had criticized Seaman's for what this author calls its "fatal flaw," 158 by
writing "[t]he Seaman's opinion ...is ambiguous as to the origin of [its]
holding.' ' 159 The Freeman & Mills court acknowledged Judge Hall's criticism that
the failure of Seaman's to rely on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing theory as the basis for tort liability, or to justify the expansion of tort
liability for bad faith denial of contract versus bad faith dispute of contractual
terms, caused confusion for courts attempting to interpret Seaman's.
t60
The last persuasive decision the majority recognized is Elxsi v. Kukje
America Corp.16' There, Judge Aguilar found fault with Seaman's for the same
reason as his counterparts in the Ninth Circuit. 62 Courts faced a formidable task
under Seaman's in trying to make the elusive distinction between bad faith denial
of existence of a contract and bad faith denial of liability under a contract. 63 The
Freeman & Mills majority finally concluded this section of its opinion by
realizing that its holding in Seaman's must have been flawed since so many
courts of other jurisdictions had rejected or criticized it. 6'
d. Legal Literature-More Criticism of Seaman's
Lastly, in the Freeman & Mills majority opinion, the California Supreme
Court reviewed the plethora of scholarly commentary that its decision in
Seaman's had generated. 65 It cited thirteen law review articles that criticized
Seaman's. 66 For instance, several commentators criticized the Seaman's holding
for its infamous failure 6 7 to provide guidance for making the difficult distinction
156. Freeman & Mills, II Cal. 4th at 99, 900 P.2d at 677, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428 (quoting OkiAmerica,
872 F.2d at 317) (Kozinski, J., concurring)).
157. Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989).
158. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (defining the "fatal flaw" of Seaman's).
159. Air-Sea Forwarders, 880 F.2d at 184.
160. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 99, 900 P.2d at 677-78, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428-29 (citing Air-Sea
Forwarders, 880 F.2d at 184 n.1 1).
161. 672 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
162. Elxsi, 672 F. Supp. at 1296; see supra notes 152-54, 160 and accompanying text (recounting the
criticisms of Judge Kozinski and Circuit Judge Hall with regard to Seaman's).
163. Elxsi, 672 F. Supp. at 1296.
164. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 100, 900 P.2d at 678, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429.
165. Id. at 100-02, 900 P.2d at 678-79,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429-30.
166. Id. at 100-01, 900 P.2d at 678-79,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429-30.
167. See supra notes 122-26, 152-53, 160 and accompanying text (describing the infamous failure of
Seaman's as it does not provide direction for distinguishing between illegal denial of a contract's existence and
lawful denial of liability under a contract's terms).
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between bad faith denial of contract and bad faith denial of liability under a
contract. 68 Others generally criticized Seaman's because of the confusion it
created 69 and the questions it left unanswered. 70 The Freeman & Mills majority
concluded "'the breadth of the criticism.., is disturbing and.., is pertinent to
our determination whether or not to reconsider [Seaman's]. ' '7 As the court
noted at the outset of its Freeman & Mills opinion, when developments sub-
sequent to a decision show that the decision may have been unsound or that it has
become ripe for reconsideration, reexamination of the opinion is proper.
172
3. Assault Complete-Seaman's Is Overruled
Given the expansive assault the court had just launched on Seaman's, in what
is referred to as "subsequent developments" in the Freeman & Mills opinion, but
what was really rejection and criticism of Seaman's from all directions, the court
overruled Seaman's.73 The new rule in California is that tort remedies, in the
form of punitive damages, are not available for either bad faith denial of a
noninsurance contract's existence, or bad faith denial of liability under a
noninsurance contract, unless a plaintiff can plead and prove some independent
tort duty arising on the part of the defendant, and that duty was breached when
the defendant breached the contract.'74
168. See, e.g., Putz & Klippen, supra note 7, at 459; John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary
Damages in Actions Based upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 1565, 164041 (1986); Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion
of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 377, 401-02 (1986); Landsdorf, supra note *, at 223-28; John Monaghan, Note, Extending
the Bad Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial Contracts, 65 B.U. L. REV. 355, 376 (1985).
169. See, e.g., Sebert, supra note 168, at 1640-41; Raymond Wallenstein, Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 20 U.
WEST L.A. L. REv. 113. 124 (1988-1989); Landsdorf, supra note *, at 223 & n.79; Eileen A. Scallen,
Comment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,
69 MtNN. L. Rnv. 1161, 1175 (1985); Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith? The
Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1335, 1363 (1988); see also
Oxley, supra note 7, at 44.
170. See, e.g., Landsdorf, supra note *, at 227-31 (discussing such dilemmas as what quantum of proof
is required to establish denial of a contract's existence and whether a special relationship is a necessary element
of the Seaman's tort); Kurt E. Wilson, How Contracts Escalate into Torts, CAL. LAw., Jan. 1992, at 59-60
(attempting to harmonize the various unanswered questions concerning the required elements of a Seaman's
cause of action); supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (raising the question whether the tort applies to
only bad faith denial of a contract's existence or bad faith denial of liability under a contract); see also supra
notes 115-46 and accompanying text (reviewing how the Courts of Appeal grappled with the several questions
left unanswered in Seaman's).
171. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 102, 900 P.2d at 679, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430 (quoting Moradi-
Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 65,250 Cal. Rptr. at 123).
172. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 93, 900 P.2d at 673, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 424.
173. Id. at 102-03, 900 P.2d at 679-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31.
174. Id.
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The court again underscored the "infamous failure" of Seaman's. "1 It recited
the anomaly of extending tort remedies to bad faith denial of a contract yet
treating as only contractual, with only contract remedies, bad faith denial of
liability under a contract; an aberration others had already criticized.176 Further,
the court poked fun at the Seaman's definition of bad faith: committing acts
offensive to "accepted notions of business ethics."177 The Freeman & Mills court
thought such a definition could turn every contract breach into a tort because
"stonewalling," as the Seaman's court had called it, is fairly common in the
business world.178 After all, a defendant's statement to a prospective plaintiff of
"'see you in court,' could incidentally accompany every breach of contract.' ' 79
Finally, the court concluded by stating its preference for legislative, rather than
judicial, activity in this area."s Nothing prevents the state legislature, it asserted,
from enacting measures to provide attorneys fees for noninsurance bad faith
cases, to extend compensatory damages to certain attenuated damages like lost
profits, or to even reinstate Seaman's.
t1 t
C. The Freeman & Mills Concurring Opinion-Disagreement Over Hunter
Justice Kennard, joined by Justice Arabian, wrote separately to concur in the
majority's disposition of Freeman & Mills. 82 Both justices disagreed with the
majority's discussion of Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc.18 3
In Hunter, an employee sued his former employer for breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.' 84 The
plaintiff claimed that he worked well with his coworkers and received excellent
evaluations; yet one day his supervisor advised him that his position was being
175. See supra notes 122-26, 152-53, 167-68 and accompanying text (describing the infamous failure
of Seaman's as not providing direction for distinguishing between illegal denial of a contract's existence versus
lawful denial of liability under a contract's terms).
176. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 102-03, 900 P.2d at 679-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31.
177. Id. at 103,900 P.2d at 680,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431; Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
178. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431; see supra note 60
and accompanying text (defining "stonewalling").
179. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431; see supra note 60
and accompanying text (describing the "see you in court" position).
180. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
181. Id. The majority seemed pleased to note that, so far, the state legislature has failed to express an
intention "either to expand contract breach recovery or to provide tort damages for ordinary contract breach."
Id. See infra notes 275-76 for a discussion of the various instances in which attorney's fees are currently
permitted by law.
182. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 104, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
183. Id.; 6 Cal. 4th 1174, 864 P.2d 88,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (1993).
184. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1179, 864 P.2d at 89,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
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eliminated and that, if he did not resign, he would be fired. 85 To the contrary, the
supervisor testified that he had disciplined Hunter for absenteeism, that Hunter
told the supervisor that he was contemplating quitting due to personal problems,
and that eventually Hunter did exactly that. 86 At trial, the jury found for Hunter
for breach of the implied covenant not to terminate employment without good
cause, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud,
awarding contract and tort damages of $120,000. 187 The Court of Appeal affirmed
and the California Supreme Court granted review to consider Foley's effect on
a terminated employee's action for fraud.
88
The high court reversed the holding on the fraud cause of action. 189 The
majority reasoned that Foley precluded awarding tort remedies for fraud by
employer misrepresentations made to induce termination of an employment con-
tract. The court found that the plaintiff, in order to recover tort remedies, would
have to plead and prove fraud by misrepresentation separate from the termination
of the employment contract.' g The majority stated that the employer "simply
employed a falsehood to do what it otherwise could have accomplished directly,"
that Up-Right's misrepresentation was essentially a constructive termination, and,
as such, Hunter could not prove that he detrimentally relied on Up-Right's false
statements, an essential element of a fraud action. 91 The majority further noted
that, in the context of employment contracts, "it is difficult to conceive of... a
misrepresentation made by the employer to effect termination [that] could ever
rise to the level of a separately actionable fraud."' 92
Justice Arabian concurred in Justice Mosk's dissent in Hunter and Justice
Kennard dissented separately. Both dissenting opinions disagreed with the
majority's premise that Foley controlled the case. 193 The dissenters further agreed
185. Id. at 1179, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
186. Id. at 1179, 864 P.2d at 89-90,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
187. Id. at 1180, 864 P.2d at 90,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
188. Id at 1183, 864 P.2d at 92, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13; see also supra text accompanying notes 91-102
(discussing Foley).
189. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1187, 864 P.2d at 95, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
190. Id. at 1184-85, 864 P.2d at 93-94,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13-14.
191. Id. at 1184, 864 P.2d at 93, 26 Cal, Rptr. 2d at 13. A claim of fraud in California requires that the
plaintiff establish five elements: (1) The defendant's misrepresentation; (2) the defendant's knowledge of its
falsity; (3) the defendant's intent to induce the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentation; (4) the plaintiff's
justifiable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation; and (5) the plaintiff's resulting damages. Watts v.
Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 132 Cal. App. 3d 516,522 n.2, 183 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 n.2 (1982).
192. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1184-85, 864 P.2d at 93, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
193. Id. at 1187, 864 P.2d at 95, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15 (Mosk, J., dissenting); id. at 1196, 864 P.2d at
101, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text
(addressing the Freeman & Mills majority opinion discussion of Foley). Justice Mosk found that fraud existed
in Hunter and distinguished Foley in that "Foley nowhere held that actions for traditional intentional torts
which might accompany a wrongful discharge are barred." Id. at 1188, 864 P.2d at 96, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard merely agreed with Justice Mosk's statement that Hunter's result is not
dictated by Foley. Id. at 1196, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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that, on the facts before them in Hunter, a cause of action for fraud existed.
Justice Mosk asserted that the employer's statements in Hunter constituted
promissory fraud and, thus, tort recovery is allowed.194 Justice Kennard disagreed
with the majority's characterization of Up-Right's statements to induce Hunter's
termination as a constructive wrongful termination.' 95 Instead, she maintained that
constructive wrongful discharge amounts to the legal consequence of the
employer's conduct, not the employer's conduct itself. 96 She disagreed with
giving Up-Right's statements, which included that Hunter's position was being
eliminated and that if he did not quit he would be fired, legal recognition as
constructive wrongful termination. She then distinguished the employer's conduct
in Hunter from other cases in which the court found that constructive wrongful
termination had occurred. 97
Even after Freeman & Mills, all California Supreme Court justices still
currently agree that the violation of some independent duty imposed by tort law
gives rise to tort remedies, even if the defendant's conduct also constitutes a
breach of contract. 98 The reason for the concurring opinion in Freeman & Mills
is best understood in light of this notion. Justice Kennard and Justice Arabian,
like the majority, found that Belcher's conduct did not rise to the level of a tort;
therefore, the plaintiff accounting firm could not recover punitive damages.' 99
194. Id. at 1191, 1193-94, 864 P.2d at 98, 99-100, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18, 20 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
'"Promissory fraud' is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily
implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied
misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud"Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631,638, 909 P.2d
981, 985,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 381 (1996). Promissory fraud is a tort and, if proven, the plaintiff may recover
tort damages; but the plaintiff may be limited to an election of remedies between recovery on the contract or
on the tort. Id.
195. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1196, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1197, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 1196-97, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard
defined constructive wrongful discharge as an employee's forced resignation "as a result of actions or
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have resigned, and the
employer-with actual or constructive knowledge of the intolerable actions or conditions and their impact on
the employee--could have remedied the situation but did not." Id. at 1196, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 22 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
198. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 102, 900 P.2d at 679-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31 (Lucas
majority opinion); id. at 104, 900 P.2d at 680,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard concurring opinion, in which
Arabian joined); id. at 104, 900 P.2d at 681, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432 (Mosk concurring and dissenting opinion);
see RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CoNrTAcrs § 355 (1979) (forbidding punitive damages "for a breach of
contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable");
25 C.J.S. Damages § 120 (1955) (prohibiting punitive damages for breach of contract but allowing them "in
tort cases incidentally involving a contract where the requisite aggravating circumstances are present"); 5
CORBIN, supra note 10, § 1077 (asserting that punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract,
but certain cases allow them when elements are present that fall "within the field of tort or as closely analogous
thereto").
199. Compare Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 104,900 P.2d at 680,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard,
J., concurring) (explaining that "the conduct complained of by plaintiff here.., does not amount to the
violation of any independent duty arising from principles of tort law") with id. at 90, 900 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal.
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Unlike the majority here and in Hunter, Justice Kennard and Justice Arabian
found that Up-Right's statements in Hunter had amounted to commission of the
tort of fraud. 200 They therefore wrote separately to note that they disagreed with
the Freeman & Mills majority opinion discussion of Hunter, but that they agreed
with the disposition of Freeman & Mills on its facts?'
D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion-For Consistency's Sake
Justice Mosk, consistent with his membership in the majority of Seaman's
itself, dissented because he disagreed with overruling Seaman 'S02 Instead, he
thought the court should have clarified the Seaman's holding.2 3 As the sole dis-
senting justice, Justice Mosk offered his understanding of Seaman's to be that it
stood for the proposition "that a contract action may also sound in tort when the
breach of contract is intentional and in bad faith, and is aggravated by certain
particularly egregious forms of intentionally injurious activity." 2°4 Since Justice
Mosk found no such "intentionally injurious activity" by Belcher, he concurred
in the majority's disposition of the case in Belcher's favor.205
In a well-structured opinion, Justice Mosk first explained the noninsurance
contract circumstances under which he believes tortious breach of contract may
occur . 6 After discussing the underlying purposes served by contract and tort law,
Rptr. 2d at 422 (majority opinion) (affirming appellate court's verdict for defendant and finding tort recovery
unavailable in the instant case).
200. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1197, 864 P.2d at 102,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22-23 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see
id. (finding fraud on the part of defendant); id. at 1193-94, 864 P.2d at 99-100,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (Mosk,
J., dissenting, in which Arabian, L, concurred) (finding all elements of fraud present).
201. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 104, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
202. No doubt Justice Mosk's general inclination toward expanding tort liability had something to do
with his opinion in favor of retaining Seaman's. See Olson, supra note 92, at 6 (comparing Justice Mosk to
former Chief Justices Roger Traynor, Donald Wright, and Rose Bird in terms of willingness to expand tort
liability).
203. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 104, 900 P.2d at 680-81, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431-32 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
204. Id. at 105, 900 P.2d at 681, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Notice
that Seaman's explicitly held only that a contracting party could be liable for tort remedies when it denies the
existence of the contract in bad faith and without probable cause (Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard
Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984)), and said nothing about
denials aggravated by "egregious forms of intentionally injurious activity." Perhaps Justice Mosk derives these
aggravating circumstances proposition from the statute governing when punitive damages are available, which
refers to oppression, fraud, or malice as the requisite circumstances that must be present for a plaintiff to plead
punitive damages in actions for the breach of obligations not arising from contract. See CAL. CIV. CODE §
3294(a) (West Supp. 1996).
205. Freeman & Mills, I I Cal. 4th at 105, 900 P.2d at 681, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
206. Id. at 105-13, 900 P.2d at 681-87, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432-38 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
1436
1996 /Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.
and their fundamental differences, 2 7 Justice Mosk recognized, as had his
colleagues in their separate opinions, that a party to a contract can seek tort
remedies for breach of the contract if the behavior constituting the contract breach
violates some independent duty imposed by tort lawW8 Justice Mosk cited
Prosser's rule that tort liability for the misperformance of a contract will generally
attach whenever there would be liability for gratuitous performance without the
contract-when the misperformance creates foreseeable, unreasonable risk of
harm to the plaintiff's interests.2 9
Again, however, the justices are not in disagreement over this proposition.
Rather, one point of division between Justice Mosk and his colleagues seems to
be the willingness to impose tort liability for certain intentional breaches of con-
tract by deeming a contract defendant's conduct socially wrong or "deviati[ng]
from socially useful business practices" 20 Justice Mosk cited two Court of
Appeal cases in support of the view that contract law imposes tort liability when
a defendant's conduct constitutes a distinct social wrong apart from the breach of
contract.21' The majority, however, pointed to the high court's own cases, such
207. See KEEFON Er AL., supra note 11, § 1, at 5-6 (describing the function of contract law as protecting
the single, limited interest in having the promises of others performed while the law of torts allocates losses
arising out of human activities, protecting individuals for losses "suffered within the scope of their legally
recognized interests generally, rather than one interest only").
208. Freeman & Mills, I 1 Cal. 4th at 106, 900 P.2d at 682, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting); see supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing availability of tort remedies when a
contract breach violates some independent tort duty imposed by law, and giving examples).
209. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 107, 900 P.2d at 682, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 92, at 660-61); see infra note 269 (citing examples
of these types of situations).
210. Freeman & Mills, I I Cal. 4th at 109, 900 P.2d at 684, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting); see supra note 202 (noting Justice Mosk's preference for expanding tort liability).
211. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 108, 900 P.2d at 683-84, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434-35 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk cited Walker v. Signal Companies, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 3d 982, 149
Cal. Rptr. 119 (1978), for the rule that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages when a defendant induces the
breached contract by promissory fraud, a rule justified "by the fact that the breach of a fraudulently induced
contract is a significantly greater wrong, from society's standpoint, than an ordinary breach." Freeman & Mills,
11 Cal. 4th at 108, 900 P.2d at 684, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). In Walker,
the court held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a claim of fraud by satisfying its five
elements. Walker, 84 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 125; see supra note 191 (listing the elements of
fraud). The Freeman & Mills majority would agree, however, that tort remedies may be recovered when
plaintiff pleads and proves fraud, apart from the breach of contract. See, e.g., Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., 6 Cal.
4th 1174, 1184-85, 864 P.2d 88, 93-94, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 13-14 (1993) (reasoning that the plaintiff would
have to prove fraud separate from breach of contract to recover tort remedies for breach of an employment
agreement). Furthermore, a different court found that the rule is justified not by the "greater wrong" involved
but rather by the fact that California Civil Code § 3294 lists the word "fraud" alone as an adequate basis for
awarding punitive damages. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1996); Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Marina View Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802, 822 (1977).
The other appellate case Justice Mosk cited, Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 235 Cal.
App. 3d 1220, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (1991), similarly involved a fraud claim in the context of a real estate
contract. The court affirmed the fraud cause of action after finding the evidence sufficient to meet the elements
of fraud. Las PalmasAssocs., 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1239, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311. The court relied on California
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as Foley, Hunter, and Applied Equipment, for the proposition that, in fact, the
courts should be reluctant to deem a contract defendant's conduct socially wrong
and thus to permit tort remedies, the approach taken in the insurance contract
cases. Instead, tort recovery for contract breaches should be limited to the
insurance area, absent the violation of an independent tort duty?
2
Continuing to address the noninsurance contract circumstances under which
Justice Mosk asserts that tortious breach of contract may occur, Justice Mosk next
considered tortious breaches of contract based on the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing,213 rather than independent conventional torts like fraud. The
associate justice referred to the insurance line of cases as an example of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing serving as a predicate to allow tort
recovery in contract cases.14 Justice Mosk admonished California courts not to
be "preoccupied" with limiting the tortious breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing theory in contract cases, rather than to be "useful" by
"identifying specific practices employed by contracting parties that merit the
imposition of tort remedies. 215 Justice Mosk then addressed two broad categories
of persuasive authority that he saw as expanding the tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory in contract cases. The
concurring and dissenting justice cited these categories of persuasive authority in
an attempt to bolster his argument that California should not be slow to attach tort
liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
contract cases. The first category consisted of cases in which tortious means are
utilized by one of the contracting parties to deceive the other into foregoing
contractual rights. The other category comprised cases of intentional breach in
which the breaching party knows that the breach entails attendant consequences
to the other party that are especially injurious.
However, at least some of the authority that Justice Mosk cited appears
misplaced. For instance, Justice Mosk discussed Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden
Medical Systems, Inc. 216 as a case representing his first category of cases
expanding tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in contract cases. In this category, tortious means are utilized by one of
Civil Code § 1710(4) for its definition of fraud, which defined "fraud" as "[a] promise, made without any
intention of performing it," and California Civil Code § 3294. which permits punitive damages in fraud actions.
Las Palmas Assocs., 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1238-39, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310-11.
212. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 94-95, 900 P.2d at 674-75, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425-26; see supra
notes 91-114 and accompanying text (discussing Foley, Hunter, and Applied Equipment).
213. See supra note 26 (describing the parameters of the implied-by-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in all contracts).
214. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 109, 900 P.2d at 684, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
215. Id.
216. 955 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1992).
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the contracting parties to deceive the other into foregoing contractual rights.2 7
The plaintiff in Advanced Medical sued the defendant for breach of a distribution
contract and intentional interference with contractual relations. The defendant
attempted to get out of the contract by marketing products designed to compete
with the plaintiff, and failed to supply the plaintiff with support services as the
contract required.2 8 The Advanced Medical court, though, never mentioned the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a predicate for tort liability,
instead finding that the plaintiffs right to punitive damages "emanate from
plaintiff's tort claim."219 All the court found necessary under Pennsylvania law,
to sustain the punitive damages award on the plaintiffs tort claim, was the
defendant's willful or malicious outrageous conduct?2
The other category of cases that Justice Mosk found exemplified the ex-
pansion of tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in contract cases was the kind of intentional breach that the breaching
party knows involves especially injurious attendant consequences. Here, Justice
Mosk cited K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock.22' K Mart had employed Ponsock as a
forklift driver for a term until his retirement, which the court found amounted to
Ponsock being a tenured employee.222 Subsequently, K Mart fired Ponsock six
months prior to his anticipated retirement, after which he would be paid in full by
K Mart, for allegedly "'defacing company property, forklift, with misappropriated
merchandise, paint, on company time.""22 K Mart had failed, however, to follow
the employment agreement that called for its providing assistance and correction
notices to Ponsock in the event of his deficient performance. 224 The employment
contract also mandated that K Mart could terminate Ponsock only after a series
of these correction notices proved that his performance remained unacceptable.m
Justice Mosk best summarized the court's holding by stating "the Nevada
Supreme Court allowed a $50,000 award of punitive damages to stand when an
employer discharged a long-term employee on a fabricated charge for the purpose
of defeating the latter's contractual entitlement to retirement benefits.'226 The
Ponsock court reasoned that punitive damages were available on a "bad faith
discharge" theory, since K Mart's real motive was to divest Ponsock of his retire-
ment rights, finding the "bad faith discharge" theory based on the covenant of
217. Freeman & Mills, II Cal. 4th at 110, 900 P.2d at 684-85, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435-36 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
218. Advanced Medical, 955 F.2d at 189-91.
219. Id. at 202 n.8.
220. Id. at 202.
221. 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
222. K Mart Corp., 732 P.2d at 1366.
223. Id. at 1367.
224. Id. at 1366.
225. Id.
226. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 112,900 P.2d at 686,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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good faith and fair dealing implied in contracts.2 7 The court found, however, that
such tort liability in a contract case, based upon breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, could only be found if there existed a special
relationship between the parties.2 On the facts before it, the court found that a
special relationship between the parties indeed existed.229 The California Supreme
Court, however, has disagreed with its sister-state supreme court on this point,
and has refused to call the employer-employee association a special relationship
in the context of tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.230
Justice Mosk concluded the section of his opinion in which he described the
noninsurance contract circumstances under which he asserts tortious breach of
contract may occur by stating:
In sum, the above cited cases show that an intentional breach of contract
may be found to be tortious when the breaching party exhibits an extreme
disregard for the contractual rights of the other party, either knowingly
harming the vital interests of a promisee so as to create substantial mental
distress or personal hardship, or else employing coercion or dishonesty
to cause the promisee to forego its contractual rights23
The associate justice then devoted the next part of his opinion to a reconsideration
of Seaman's, in light of the first part of his opinion discussing expansion of the
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory in
contract cases elsewhere.
Justice Mosk first reviewed the facts of Seaman's and its holding.232 He then
bluntly approved of what this Note has referred to as "the fatal flaw of Sea-
man 's.,2 33 The now dissenting justice found it preferable that the Seaman's
majority (of which he was a member) had "identiffied] specific practices used by
Standard that violated 'accepted notions of business ethics"' 4 rather than having
227. KMart Corp., 732 P.2d at 1369-70.
228. Id. at 1372.
229. Id. at 1370; see supra note 49 (discussing California's special relationship factors).
230. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 690-93, 765 P.2d 373, 393-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
232-35 (1988); see supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text (discussing Foley).
231. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 113, 900 P.2d at 686-87, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437-38 (Mosk, 3.,
concurring and dissenting).
232. Id. at 113-14, 900 P.2d at 687-88,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438-39 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting);
see supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Seaman's and its holding).
233. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (describing the "fatal flaw" of Seaman's).
234. The only "specific practices used by Standard that violated 'accepted notions of business ethics'
that the Seaman's court identified in its analysis was defendant Standard's adoption of a "stonewalling"
position when one of its agents stated "see you in court" without probable cause and with no belief in the
existence of a defense. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The Freeman
& Mills majority rejected limiting the Seaman's tort to such "stonewalling" tactics, dismissing such conduct
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transformed the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory into a tort
carte blanche by relying on it.235 Justice Mosk finally offered his own criticism
of Seaman's. In his view, Seaman's was too narrow because it failed to make a
distinction between bad faith denial of the existence of a contract and bad faith
denial of liability under a contract. 36 Justice Mosk then admitted that:
Seaman's was overly broad because, for a number of reasons, it appears
to have been unwise to impose tort liability for all breaches that involve
bad faith denial of a contract or liability under the contract. Although the
bad faith denial of contractual liability may be ethically inexcusable, we
should hesitate to categorically impose tort liability on such activity for
fear it may overly deter legitimate activities that we wish to permit or
encourage. 7
Ultimately, however, Justice Mosk came to the conclusion that the high court
had decided Seaman's correctly. The justice explained that some intentional
contract breaches in the commercial sphere that cause the injured party emotional
distress or personal hardship, such as "the frustrations that attend breached con-
tracts, unreliable suppliers, and the like are part of the realities of commerce. 238
Justice Mosk noted that society requires the injured party look to the marketplace
to seek substitute performance to mitigate losses and to pursue only contract
damages for the losses that cannot be mitigated.2 9 Justice Mosk continued,
however, by citing Seaman's as the type of intentional contract breach that is not
part and parcel of the commercial world: given the oil crisis underway when the
Seaman's transactions occurred, Standard did more than just breach a contract
and cause hardship; Standard knew that its conduct, under the circumstances,
would have the practical effect of forcing Seaman's out of business.240 Such a
case satisfied the elements of the Seaman's tort according to Justice Mosk: (1)
Intentional breach of contract without probable cause; (2) without belief that the
contract does not exist; (3) with knowledge or intent that the breach will cause the
as potentially incidental to the breach of every contract. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
235. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 114-15, 900 P.2d at 688, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167,206 Cal. Rptr. at 363).
236. Freeman & Mills, I 1 Cal. 4th at 115, 900 P.2d at 688, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting); see supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (calling this failure to distinguish between the
two types of contractual bad faith the "infamous failure" of Seaman's).
237. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 115, 900 P.2d at 688, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting) (emphasis in original); see infra notes 295-99 and accompanying text (discussing the chilling
economic effect of punitive damages remedies in commercial contractual settings).
238. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 116,900 P.2d at 689,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
239. Id.
240. Id.; see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (recounting Standard's conduct).
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other party severe damages that are not easily mitigated; and (4) the other party
indeed experiences such severe harm.241
The final part of Justice Mosk's opinion declared essentially that the facts of
Freeman & Mills did not establish the just-noted third and fourth elements of the
Seaman's tort.242 As such, Justice Mosk concurred in the majority's disposition
of Freeman & Mills in defendant Belcher's favor. Had the courts previously
clarified the elements of the Seaman's tort, as Justice Mosk did in his Freeman
& Mills concurring and dissenting opinion, perhaps Seaman's would have
survived, since lower courts would have been less confused about the parameters
of the Seaman's tort.243 At least Justice Mosk's position remained consistent
throughout the life of Seaman's.
IV. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS OF FREEMAN & MILLS
Well-recognized legal principles and sound economic policy justifies the
court's holding in Freeman & Mills. The case should prove to be beneficial to
contracting parties in general.
A. Legal Principles
1. The Goals of Tort and Contract
Perhaps the most obvious legal principles that best justify the court's decision
in Freeman & Mills are the very objectives of tort and contract law. While the
threat of punitive damages may serve a proper purpose in the law of tort,2" its
presence is inappropriate in the contract context.
Two of the chief purposes of contract law are protection of the reasonable
expectations of parties to a bargain and compensation for reasonable reliance on
the promises of others.245 Consistent with these goals of contract law, the primary
241. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 116,900 P.2d at 689,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). To appreciate the confusion experienced by courts in attempting to define the Seaman's tort,
compare Justice Mosk's view of the elements of the Seaman's tort with a 1992 rendition offered by a legal
commentator in the state's barjournal. Wilson, supra note 170, at 59 (listing the elements as: (1) An underlying
contract; (2) breached by defendant; (3) where defendant denies liability by asserting that the contract does not
exist; (4) in bad faith; and (5) without probable cause).
242. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 117,900 P.2d at 689,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting); see id. (finding that Belcher had only intentionally breached the contract and asserted a bad
faith defense to contractual liability and that the contract did not exist).
243. See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text (discussing the alleged elements of the Seaman's
tort that confused appellate courts faced with attempting to apply Seaman's).
244. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing the purpose punitive damages serve).
245. GORDON D. SCHABER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL § 88, at 147 (3d ed.
1990); see Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 105, 900 P.2d at 682, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting) (finding that contract actions are created to protect the interest in having promises performed);
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remedy that the American legal system affords for breach of contract is
expectation damages: the placement of the injured party in as good a position as
the party would have been had the contract been fully performed. 24This principal
remedy of contract law has been historically limited, however, in that damages
based upon an aggrieved party's expectation are awarded only to the extent that
such damages are reasonably certain and relatively foreseeable.2 47 Professor
1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 1.6, at 20-21 (recounting the common law development of contract law,
noting that the extension of the assumpsit action to the executory exchange of promises had the "important
implication" of courts protecting promises by making promisors compensate them for their disappointed
expectations, and offering as the rationale for this development of contract law that protection of parties'
expectations is "the most effective way of protecting reliance," since contracts are of little use if parties cannot
rely on their legal efficacy).
246. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970) (delineating the measure of damages for contract breach
as the amount that will compensate the injured party for all detriment proximately caused by the breach "or
which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom"); U.C.C. § 1-106(l) (1990)
(providing that remedial provisions of the U.C.C. should be liberally administered to place the aggrieved party
"in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
347 cmt. a (1979) (interpreting the general measure of contract damages to provide plaintiff with a monetary
sum sufficient enough to place plaintiff in as good a position as plaintiff would have been had defendant
performed); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.8, at 186 (asserting that, in most breach of contract cases, the
injured party recovers damages sufficient to place the party in as good a position as the party would have been
had the contract been performed).
Alternatively, contract plaintiffs who are unable to prove expectation damages may recover "reliance
damages," which compensates plaintiff for actual expenses incurred by relying upon the contract. See Cobum
v. California Portland Cement Co., 144 Cal. 81, 84, 77 P. 771,772 (1904) (stating that where there is no market
value for goods that are the subject of a contract, or where such market value is not an appropriate or adequate
index of damages, the proper measure of damages is recompense for the actual loss suffered); 3 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 10, § 12.8, at 187 (stating that generally courts allow expectation damages rather than reliance
damages); SCHABER & ROHWER, supra note 245, § 130, at 263 (discussing reliance damages, which may be
assessed when expectation damages are not proven). Since expectation damages are the primary remedy for
breach of contract, the other types of contract remedies, such as reliance damages, specific performance,
restitution, liquidated damages and penalty clauses, and others, are not discussed here.
247. For the certainty requirement, see, for example: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3301 (West 1970) (declaring that
"[n]o damages can be recovered for a breach of contract which are not clearly ascertainable in both their nature
and origin"); U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1990) (stating that leaving one or more terms of a contract open does not
prove fatal to formation provided that "there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979) (precluding recovery of damages unless evidence
establishes them with reasonable certainty); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.15, at 252 (discussing
uncertainty as a limitation to an award of damages for breach of contract).
For the foreseeability requirement, see, for example: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970) (imposing
expressly a proximate causation prerequisite on plaintiff's recovery of damages for contract breach); U.C.C.
§ 2-714(1) (1990) (permitting a buyer of goods to recover from the seller losses "resulting in the ordinary
course of events"); Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 502, 200 P. 11, 14 (1921) (holding defendant liable for
plaintiffs loss that was the natural result of defendant's breach and that was within the parties' reasonable
contemplation upon execution of the contract); Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151
(1854) (refusing to permit a miller to recover lost profits for closing down his mill due to the defendant-
manufacturer's sale to him of a faulty steam engine crankshaft on the ground that the miller failed to notify the
defendant his mill was closed and, as such, the closing of the mill could not "have been in the contemplation
of both parties, at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 351(1) (1979) (permitting recovery of only those damages "that the party in breach
... [had] reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made").
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Farnsworth explains that the certainty requirement emerged in early American
courts in an effort to control the jury's discretion in awarding damages and to
express "a judicial reluctance to recognize interests that are difficult or impossible
to measure in money. 248 With regard to the unforeseeability requirement,
Professor Farnsworth justifies this limitation by asserting "that liability for
unforeseeable loss might impose upon an entrepreneur a burden greatly out of
proportion to the risk that the entrepreneur originally supposed was involved and
to the corresponding benefit that the entrepreneur stood to gain. 249 Indeed, both
of these limitations on damages for a breach of contract seem fitting in light of
contract law's goal of protecting reasonable expectations. It would be unfair to
subject a contracting party to speculation and discretion in measuring damages
and to consequences of which the party had no conceivable idea when it entered
into the contract.
The goal of tort law, on the other hand, is a very different one. Rather than
imposing liability for breaking voluntary promises made to another, tort law seeks
to compensate individuals by legally mandating, based upon then-existing social
policy, a duty upon everyone to abstain from injuring the person, property, or
other intangible rights of anotherY0 A corollary of this goal is tort law's function
of deterring potential tortfeasors from causing harm in the first instance. t The
measure of damages for the commission of most torts is compensation designed
to represent the closest possible pecuniary equivalent of the plaintiff's loss-to
place the plaintiff in the same position the plaintiff occupied prior to the tort's
248. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.15, at 252-53 (citing Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491
(1858), the leading case on the topic).
249. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.14, at 241.
250. See CAL. CrI. CODE § 1708 (West 1985) (reciting "[elvery person is bound, without contract, to
abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his rights"); KEETON ET AL,,
supra note 11, § 1, at 6 (asserting that the purpose of tort law is to allocate responsibility for losses arising out
of human activities by affording compensation for injuries sustained by one person at the hands of another);
WADE ET AL., supra note 13, at 1 (including four purposes of tort law: (1) To provide peaceful dispute
resolution; (2) to deter wrongful behavior; (3) to encourage socially responsible conduct; and (4) to restore
injured parties to their previous state by way of compensation).
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1979) (explaining that, unlike the law of
contracts or restitution, the law of torts often seeks to punish tortfeasors to deter future tortious acts); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 11, § 4. at 25-26 (calling the deterrence goal of tort law a "prophylactic" factor designed
to prevent future harm and to admonish the wrongdoer; asserting that when court decisions are made, and
prospective defendants thereby realize their potential liability, "a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence
of the harm" exists; and concluding that punitive damages are sometimes a proper remedy for the commission
of torts since the goal of punitive damages is to deter undesirable conduct).
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occurrence.s 2 To this end, the foreseeabilitys 3 and certainty limitations found in
contract damages do not exist in tort damages.5 4 In its quest to make the tort
plaintiff whole again, the court assesses damages with little concern for their
degree of foreseeability2sS Tort plaintiffs are not required to prove their damages
with great certainty 
6
Given the different goals and remedies of contract and tort law, the presence
of a Seaman's-type cause of action muddies the contract waters. As Judge
Kozinski put it, "commercial enterprises [cannot] be expected to flourish in a
legal atmosphere where every move, every innovation, every business decision
must be hedged against the risk of exotic new causes of action and incalculable
damages. '  Tort remedies, however, should remain somewhat unpredictable in
order to deter risk of harm to others, since the goal of tort law is to prevent risk
of harm to others.2 8 With the economic role that contracts play in today's
252. VADE ETAL., supra note 13, at 508; 6 B. E. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1319
(9th ed. 1988); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970) (authorizing damages for torts in general to be that
"amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused" by defendant's "breach of an
obligation not arising from contract"); ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTrVES ON TORT LAW 344 (4th ed. 1995)
(relating that compensation in "accidental harm" cases is designed to restore the victim of injury to the position
the person occupied prior to the accident).
253. Of course, the foreseeability requirement is incorporated into tort law by way of the proximate
causation requirement rather than the damages element. KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 42, at 273
(generalizing about the two contrasting theories of proximate cause: one holds that liability should not extend
beyond the scope of foreseeable risks while the other believes that liability should extend only to directly
traceable consequences of defendant's act or omission and its indirect consequences that are foreseeable).
254. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text (discussing these limitations on contract damages).
255. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333 (West 1970) (expressly permitting tort damages that will compensate
plaintiff "for all the detriment proximately caused" by defendant "whether it could have been anticipated or
not"); Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co., 150 Cal. 51, 56, 87 P. 1093, 1095 (1906) (contrasting the
foreseeability requirement of contract damages with the tort damages rule that damages need not have been
anticipated to be recoverable). Indeed, the tort rule known as the "thin skull doctrine" holds that a defendant
must take his plaintiff as the defendant finds the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable for all of the
plaintiff's immediate damages whether they could have been anticipated or not. McCahill v. New York Transp.
Co., 94 N.E. 616 (N.Y. 1911).
256. See Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 24 Cal. 2d 290, 297-98, 149 P.2d 177, 181 (1944) (holding that tort
defendants cannot escape liability merely because plaintiff's damages are not capable of exact measurement);
REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 912 cmt. a (1979) (stating that "[t]here is no general requirement that the
injured person should prove with like definiteness the extent of the harm that he has suffered as a result of the
tortfeasor's conduct").
257. Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring);
see Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 515, 869 P.2d 454,460, 28 Cal. Rptr.
2d 475, 481 (1994) (asserting that the foreseeability limitation on contract damages fosters contractual
relationships and commercial enterprise by allowing parties to predict in advance the financial risks of their
activities).
258. See VILLiAM M. LANDEs & RICHARD A. PoSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9-12,
58 (1987) (describing the deterrence rationale of tort law, which is designed to create disincentives for injurious
activities); see also supra note 251 and accompanying text (calling the deterrence function of tort law a
corollary of tort law's main goal of compensation, based on social policy, for breach of the duty to abstain from
injuring the person, property, or other intangible rights of others).
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commercial realm,2s 9 however, contract remedies should remain stable and
predictable to fulfill contract law's goal of encouraging parties to rely on the
promises of others with the assurance that their expectations will be fulfilled
whether the contract is breached or not. Freeman & Mills, thus viewed, serves the
goals of both contract and tort by creating certainty and clarity in the remedies of
contract and tort.
2. Certainty and Clarity in Contracting
The most beneficial legal effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Freeman
& Mills is the creation of clarity and the removal of confusion concerning bad
faith contract actions in California. Objectivity, often viewed as the hallmark of
contract law, requires rules geared toward achieving certainty and clarity. This
desired result was indeed the principle force behind the high court's decision to
review Freeman & Mills and to overrule Seaman S.260 The court's retraction of
the bad faith denial of contract cause of action frees practitioners and courts from
expending an inordinate amount of time and effort in attempting to construe
Seaman's.26t No longer will parties have to guess whether the bad faith denial of
contract tort requires a special relationship between the parties.2 62 Nor will
259. See infra notes 285-99 and accompanying text (addressing the economic analysis of contract law
and its associated ramifications under Freeman & Mills).
260. Freeman & Mills, 1I Cal. 4th at 102, 900 P.2d at 679-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31 (stressing that
the uniform confusion and uncertainty about the scope and application of the Seaman's tort, together with
doubt concerning the wisdom of the Seaman's holding, convinced the court that Seaman's should be
overruled).
261. See Oki America, 872 F.2d at 314-15, 316 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Judge Kozinski's point
stressing the time courts and others wasted in applying Seaman's is too well-put to paraphrase:
Nowhere but in the Cloud Cuckooland of modem tort theory could a case like this have been
concocted. One large corporation is complaining that another obstinately refused to acknowledge
they had a contract. For this shocking misconduct it is demanding millions of dollars in punitive
damages. I suppose we will next be seeing lawsuits seeking punitive damages for maliciously
refusing to return telephone calls or adopting a condescending tone in interoffice memos .... [T]he
case drags on, kept alive by Microtech's vain hope of parlaying a business squabble into a $3.1
million gold mine. The judicial machinery keeps churning, fueled by the energies of lawyers, the
parties, a district judge, three appellate judges, their respective staffs and other myriad components
of the judicial process. One shudders to imagine the resources that would be consumed in
adjudicating a more colorable Seaman's case. We surely have more pressing claims on our limited
resources-safeguarding the environment, protecting the rights of the accused, preventing
encroachments on constitutionally protected liberties, to name a few-than helping Microtech
soothe its bruised feelings over a quarrel with its supplier.
Id.; see Landsdorf, supra note *, at 236 (asserting that courts have been judicially inefficient in analyzing
Seaman's claims in order to restrict the tort).
262. Compare Multiplex Ins. Agency, Inc. v. California Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 939, 235
Cal. Rptr. 12, 21 (1987) (finding a special relationship unnecessary to Seaman's-type recovery) and Quigley
v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 890,208 Cal. Rptr. 394,401 (1984) (same) with Okun v. Morton, 203 Cal.
App. 3d 805, 825, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 233 (1988) (holding that the bad faith denial of contract tort is limited
to those situations in which a special relationship exists between the contracting parties); see supra notes 127-
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litigants have to guess whether the Seaman's tort applies to bad faith defenses to
formation or bad faith denial of liability under the contract. 63 Whether the
Supreme Court erred fatally2 4 by not basing the Seaman's cause of action on the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is now a moot point.2 65 Finally,
parties are relieved of facing the prospect that otherwise standard, objective
contract litigation will mutate into a subjective inquiry into a party's state of
mind, a phenomenon which already overburdens the court's criminal dockets.2
California's highest court has removed the legal community's unwanted burden
of confronting these tough issues by eliminating the Seaman's tort.
Furthermore, as the Freeman & Mills court itself noted, it is anomalous to
punish a party with punitive damages for bad faith denial of a contract's existence
29 and accompanying text (addressing the conflicting Court of Appeal decisions over whether a special
relationship was a prerequisite to a Seaman's action).
263. Compare DuBarry Int'l, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Ind., Inc., 231 Cal. App. 3d 552, 571,282 Cal.
Rptr. 181, 193-94 (1991) (limiting the Seaman's cause of action to bad faith denial of a contract's existence
rather than assertion of other bad faith defenses to liability) with Multiplex, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 939, 235 Cal.
Rptr. at 21 (intimating that if appellant denied any liability under the contract in bad faith it could be sanctioned
with punitive damages under Seaman's); see supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (relating the
conflicting Court of Appeal opinions concerning whether the Seaman's tort attached to bad faith denial of
liability under a contract versus bad faith denial of the contract itself).
264. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (introducing the "fatal flaw" of Seaman's as failing
to base its holding on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
265. Compare Okun, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 232 (believing the bad faith denial of
contract tort to "(fall] squarely within the realm of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing") with Quigley,
162 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (repeating the court's admonition in Seaman's that the new bad
faith denial of existence of a contract tort is not predicated on breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing); see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (addressing the conflicting Court of Appeal
decisions with reference to whether the Seaman's tort was based on breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing theory, or violation of some other independent tort theory).
266. See DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 569, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (declining to hold that Seaman's
applies to bad faith defenses to contractual liability on the policy ground that imposition of tort damages in
such a case would expand the litigation into an "expensive and time consuming" inquiry into the breaching
party's motives, and that such an "insult to commercial predictability and certainty" would also make for an
enlarged burden on an "already overworked judicial system"); see also supra note 261 (making Judge
Kozinski's point that the courts have more pressing matters to pursue, such as criminal, constitutional, and civil
rights matters, rather than "squabbles" over money). The traditional rule of breach in contract law is that the
breaching party's motives or intent is irrelevant. See, e.g., Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.,
7 Cal. 4th 503, 516, 869 P.2d 454, 461, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 482 (1994) (holding that the law generally does
not distinguish between good and bad motives for breaching a contract); Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 14
Cal. App. 4th 70, 82, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 656-57 (1993) (noting that the extension of tort remedies for bad
faith commercial contract breaches represents a substantial departure from the traditional contract tenet of
blindness to a party's motives for its breach). Just the fact that the California Supreme Court disposes of far
more criminal cases than civil ones represents a greater potential for inquiry into subjective motives and intent,
since intent is a crucial element of the criminal law and is often litigated in criminal cases. During the fiscal
year of 1993-94, for instance, the California Supreme Court handled, by way of automatic capital appeals.
habeas-related automatic capital appeals, petitions for review, or original proceedings, a total of 6366 matters:
4226 of those were criminal (66%), while only 2140 of those were civil (34%). 1995 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CAL. ANN. REP. ch. 6, at 45-47.
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but yet not to punish it when it denies in bad faith liability under the contract.2 67
Why, for instance, is it more reprehensible for a party to deny in bad faith a
contract's existence than to fabricate an excuse based upon material breach,
impossibility, or impracticability, when the breaching party knows or should
know that there exists no plausible grounds for its claimed excuse?
Thus, Freeman & Mills calms the rough waters left in the wake of Seaman's
by restoring needed certainty and clarity to contract law. Parties can once again
voluntarily adjust their commercial legal relationships through contract with
assurance that they may dispute contractual liability if necessary without risking
exposure to the looming threat of punitive damages. They can once again
accurately gauge how much a commercial contractual venture will cost them in
the event breach becomes necessary.
3. Compensation for Bad Faith in Contracting
With its decision in Freeman & Mills, the California Supreme Court was able
to restore needed certainty and clarity to contract law without sacrificing the
potential for compensation when instances of bad faith occur in contract disputes.
The entire Freeman & Mills court specifically noted the availability of tort
remedies when an independent duty arises on the part of the defendant out of tort
law.2 8 Prior California decisions also show that contract plaintiffs may sue in tort,
and recover tort remedies, including punitive damages, when they can prove that
the defendant committed a tort incidental to the breach of the parties' contract.
269
There also remains various exceptions to the rule by which tort remedies are
available to plaintiffs arising out of intentional breach of a commercial contract.
267. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431. Commentators agree
that it was inappropriate to single out one type of bad faith breach for punitive damages treatment-bad faith
denial of a contract's existence. Oxley, supra note 7, at 47, 78.
268. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 102, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31 (citing Applied
Equip., 7 Cal. 4th 503 at 515, 869 P.2d at 460, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481); Freeman & Mills, I 1 Cal. 4th at 104,
900 P.2d at 680,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard, J., concurring); see id. at 104, 900 P.2d at 680,44 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (calling this a "tautological' proposition).
269. See, e.g., Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 486-87, 196 P.2d 915, 918-19 (1948) (striking the
plaintiff's punitive damages award in the trial court because he failed to plead a tort cause of action for deceit,
although the facts showed that the defendant had indeed committed the tort; had the plaintiff alleged deceit,
he would have been able to recover punitive damages since the breach of the contract incidentally involved
the tort of deceit); Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 680, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (1941) (affirming trial court's
judgment in awarding the plaintiff punitive damages since the defendant committed the tort of conversion
incidental to the breach of the parties' real estate contract); Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal.
App. 2d 431,451, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43, 56 (1960) (permitting award of punitive damages against the defendant for
fraud even though the tort incidentally involved a contract); Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. App. 2d 435, 454, 261
P.2d 529, 540 (1953) (holding to the same effect).
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These include, .for instance, the bad faith insurance context,270 public utility
cases, 27 fraud,272 personal comfort contracts,273 and the instances in which a
defendant may be held liable for misfeasance or negligent affirmative conduct in
the performance of a promise, such that the actor is liable in tort and contract for
physical harm to persons and things. 74
270. See supra notes 19-54 and accompanying text (discussing the bad faith insurance contract cases that
permitted tort remedies, namely punitive damages, for insurers' wrongful denial of benefits under the insurance
policy).
271. See, e.g., Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Cal. 2d 655, 662, 262 P.2d 846, 850-51 (1953)
(holding that the defendant's breach of contract to supply the plaintiff with power necessary to operate a fish
hatchery sounded in both contract and tort, but that damages under either theory were the same since the
defendant knew of the unique nature of loss the plaintiff would incur if the defendant breached the contract);
Thompson v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co., 18 Cal. App. 30, 34-35, 121 P. 937, 939 (1912) (finding a cause
of action for civil or ordinary damages resulting from the defendant's refusal to provide the plaintiff's electrical
service at his apartment, and holding that the plaintiff's claimed damages of $540 were sufficient to withstand
the defendant's general demurrer); Fort Smith & W. Ry. Co. v. Ford, 126 P. 745, 746 (Okla. 1912) (holding
that breach of the parties' contract of carriage sounds in tort because a duty arose on the defendant's part out
of the parties' contractual relations); see also KEarON Er AL., supra note 11, § 92, at 662-63 (describing the
scope of tort liability for nonperformance of contracts, or even for refusal to enter into contracts, of public
officers, common carriers, innkeepers, public warehousemen, and public utilities, such liability deriving from
the common law tort duty to "serve all comers ... to common callings").
272. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 975-79, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345, 351-54 (1984)
(failing to permit the plaintiff's recovery, only because the defendant raised a valid statute of frauds defense,
but implicitly recognizing a cause of action for promissory fraud based on allegations of employer-defendant's
promise to employ employee-plaintiff for at least three years without intent to perform the contract); see also
KEETON ErAL., supra note 11, § 92, at 664 (noting tort of deceit as exception to usual nonliability for failure
to perform a contract where a promise is made without intent to perform it); cf. Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v.
Oasis Waterpark, 52 Cal. 3d 988, 1002, 803 P.2d 370, 379, 277 Cal. Rptr. 517, 526 (1991) (barring a plaintiff-
subcontractor's tort claim against a general contractor for false promise to pay only because the plaintiff
occupied the status of unlicensed contractor and a state statute expressly forbade recovery for unlicensed
construction work).
273. See, e.g., Wynn v. Monterey Club, 111 Cal. App. 3d 789, 799-801, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878, 882-84
(1980) (permitting physical and mental suffering damages in excess of the contract's consideration for a
gambling club's intentional breach of a contract with its patron, because the patron would repay the gambling
indebtedness of the patron's wife incurred at the club in exchange for the club's agreement to refrain from
permitting the wife to gamble further in its establishment, on the theory that the club knew that a breach of the
contract would cause the patron emotional and physical suffering in the form of marital strife); Leavy v.
Cooney, 214 Cal. App. 2d 496, 500-02, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580, 583-84 (1963) (upholding mental and emotional
suffering damages against a motion picture maker for its intentional breach of contract with a public prosecutor
that the movie maker could not show a film the prosecutor agreed to make voluntarily for the movie maker
provided it would show or permit to be shown the film only on television and not in any commercial theatre);
Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198,208-09,228 P. 734,738 (1924) (establishing the exception by
allowing physical suffering and illness damages for a defendant-homeowner's intentional breach of contract
to provide the plaintiff and her family with a place to live by ousting the plaintiff on the theory that the
defendant knew of the plaintiff's ill health and old age, and such damages were in contemplation of the parties
when they executed the contract).
274. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370,406, 834 P.2d 745, 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51,
73 (1992) (restricting cause of action in negligence for careless audit reporting to client and auditor, the parties
to the contract to audit); Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 249 P.2d 257, 259 (1952) (recognizing that the
same act may constitute both the commission of a tort and the breach of a contract, and permitting tort recovery
for the defendant's negligent performance of his contractual duty to supply dairy products to the plaintiff's
child); Ross v. Forest Lawn Mem. Park, 153 Cal. App. 3d 988, 995,203 Cal. Rptr. 468,473 (1984) (holding
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Another compensation mechanism for bad faith in contracting may be the
award of attorney's fees. Even Justice Mosk recognized in his concurring and
dissenting opinion the availability of an attorney's fees award as a sanction for
certain types of disfavored civil litigation tactics. 5 The award of attorney's fees
is already authorized in certain instances.276 Attorney's fees as sanctions are more
that the plaintiffs claim of emotional distress damages for the defendant's negligent breach of its agreement
to conduct funeral services for the plaintiffs deceased daughter, by specifically making sure that none of the
punk rocker former associates of the plaintiffs deceased daughter would be present at the burial services or
would desecrate her daughter's gravesite, which the defendant failed to fulfill, was properly compensable as
a result of the breach of contract); Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 851-52, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39,
44 (1970) (permitting the plaintiff's mental suffering damages for the defendant's breach of contract to repair
rings of sentimental value, by losing the rings, on the theory that the defendant knew of the likely special
circumstance of emotional or mental suffering on the plaintiffs behalf if the defendant breached the contract);
see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 92, at 656-57 (stating the proposition and citing examples such as
a doctor's tort liability to the patient contracting for medical care when the doctor is negligent in treatment,
diagnosis, or the rendering of services without reasonable skill and care).
275. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 115, 117,900 P.2d at 688,689,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439,440 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk refers to California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5(a), which
permits an award of attorney's fees against a party to civil litigation who asserts a bad faith defense by acting
frivolously or causing unnecessary delay. See CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West Supp. 1996) (permitting
attorney's fees as a sanction to remedy bad faith denial of a contract's existence); see also Oxley, supra note
7, at 77 (noting that California Code of Civil Procedure § 2033(a) allows attorney's fees as a discovery sanction
for denial of a contract's existence after an appropriately-worded request for admission).
276. California statutes provide in many instances for the recovery of attomey's fees. See generally CAL.
Crv. PROc. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 1996) (attorney's fees, or where requisite aggravating circumstances
are present, punitive damages, for frivolous action, bad faith, or delay); id. § 386.6 (West Supp. 1996)
(interpleader); id. § 396 (West Supp. 1996) (change of venue); id. § 411.35 (West Supp. 1996) (failure to
supply statutorily-required certificate of statement of merit of actions for professional negligence against
architects, engineers, and land surveyors); id. § 411.36 (West Supp. 1996) (same for actions of occupational
negligence by common interest development association against contractor); id. § 527.6(i) (West Supp. 1996)
(injunctions to prevent harassment); id. § 527.7(c) (West Supp. 1996) (action to enjoin concerted acts of
violence); id. § 580(c) (West Supp. 1996) (mortgagor or trustor liability); id. § 585.5(e) (West Supp. 1996)
(default judgment upon failure to answer); id. § 697.410(d) (West 1987) (release of erroneous judgment lien
on real property); id. § 697.660(d) (West 1987) (same for personal property); id. § 724.260 (West Supp. 1996)
(acknowledgment of satisfaction of matured installments under installment judgment); id. § 1021.1 (West
Supp. 1996) (meritless rejection of settlement offer under § 998 of the Civil Procedure Code); id. §§ 1021.4-
1021.7 (West Supp. 1996) (damage actions based on commission of felony offense, cases resulting in public
benefit, claim for implied indemnity, and actions against peace officers in bad faith and without reasonable
cause); id. § 1021.9 (West Supp. 1996) (trespass actions); id. § 1028.5 (West Supp. 1996) (action between
small business and regulatory agency); id. § 1029.8(a) (West Supp. 1996) (personal injury action against
unlicensed person); id. § 1031 (West Supp. 1996) (action for recovery of wages for labor performed); id. §
1036 (West Supp. 1996) (costs in inverse condemnation proceedings); id. § 1038(b) (West Supp. 1996)
(defense costs on granting of summary judgment or nonsuit); id. § 1987.2 (West 1983) (expenses in making
or opposing order to quash, modify, or limit subpoena); id. § 2023(a)(9) (West Supp. 1996) (sanctions for
discovery misuse); id. § 2033(o) (West Supp. 1996) (failure to respond properly to a request for admission);
id. § 2034(k) (West Supp. 1996) (unsuccessful motion to augment or amend, or unsuccessful opposition to
motion to augment or amend, expert witness information). However, the default rule, the so-called "American
Rule," is that attorney's fees are generally not recoverable unless provided for by statute or the parties'
agreement. Id. § 1021 (West Supp. 1996). There are numerous exceptions developed by the cases. See, e.g.,
Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 620, 381 P.2d 645, 647, 30 Cal. Rptr. 821,823 (1963)
(holding that "[a] person[,] who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his
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palatable than punitive damages since attorney's fees are not subject to tre-
mendous discretion in their appraisal, as are punitive damages.2 77 Established
factors guide courts and juries in determining an amount to award as attorney's
fees.278 In Freeman & Mills, for instance, the court upheld the plaintiffs
attorney's fees award for the litigation tactics of the defendant's counsel. 9
Freeman & Mills is a good example then of other current mechanisms of
compensation designed to punish a contracting party's bad faith litigation
conduct.
interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person,] is entitled to recover compensation for
the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney's fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred");
Nelson v. Kellogg, 162 Cal. 621, 623, 123 P. 1115, 1118 (1912) (awarding attorney's fees for false arrest or
imprisonment); Estate of Legeas, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1516, 1526, 256 Cal. Rptr. 117, 123 (1989) (allowing
attorney's fees in a probate proceeding involving fraudulent destruction of a will); Glendale Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 149-50, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802, 831 (1977)
(holding award of attorney's fees proper in a fraud action that required resisting a bankruptcy petition that
formed an aspect of the fraudulent scheme).
277. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of jury discretion in assessing
punitive damages).
278. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Los Angeles-Inyo Farms Co., 134 Cal. App. 268,276,25 P.2d 224,227-28
(1933) (holding that in deciding what represents reasonable compensation for an attorney rendering services
with reference to a legal proceeding, the following factors should be considered: (1) The nature of the
litigation; (2) the litigation's level of difficulty; (3) the skill required to handle the litigation; (4) the skill
actually rendered to handle the litigation; (5) the attention given the matter by the attorney; (6) the success or
failure of the attorney's efforts; and (7) the attorney's skill and learning, including his age and experience in
the particular field of law to which the litigation belongs); CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr Rule 4-
200(B) (1989) (promulgating the following factors to be considered in determining whether attorney's fees are
excessive to the point of unconscionability: (1) The fee amount in proportion to the value of the services
rendered; (2) the level of sophistication of both the attorney and the client; (3) the novelty and the difficulty
of the issues involved in the matter, and the level of skill required to perform the legal services adequately; (4)
the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the client's case by the attorney would preclude the
attorney from handling other matters; (5) the amount of litigation involved and its results obtained by the
attorney; (6) time limitations imposed by either the client or the circumstances; (7) the nature and length of the
professional relationship between the attorney and client; (8) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorney performing the services; (9) whether the attorney's fee is fixed or contingent; (10) the time and labor
required of the attorney; and (11) whether the client gave informed consent to the attorney's fees).
279. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 89, 900 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422. The trial court
awarded Freeman & Mills $212,891 in attorney's fees. Id. at 117, 900 P.2d at 689, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); see CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West Supp. 1996) (permitting
a trial court to award attorney's fees as sanctions for bad faith conduct or tactics that are frivolous or intended
solely to cause unnecessary delay); id. § 2033(o) (West Supp. 1996) (authorizing the award of reasonable
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, for failing to make an admission after the adverse party proves
the truth of the admission).
1451
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
4. Legislative Versus Judicial Action
Another legal principle underlying the California Supreme Court's opinion
in Freeman & Mills is judicial restraint.280 As Chief Justice Lucas noted in
Freeman & Mills, the high court prefers legislative rather than judicial action
when it comes to expanding tort liability. t Decisions of courts addressing the
propriety of expanding tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing have also expressed the Chief Justice's sentiments on this
282point.
Although this Casenote has argued that punitive damages should be
unavailable as a remedy for the denial of an ordinary commercial contract's
existence, the legislature can review the subject as it sees fit. If the state
legislature finds, after a thorough evaluation of the subject, that plaintiffs are
undercompensated for defendants' intentional or bad faith denial of contractual
existence, it could always enact a statute that permits tort recovery in situations
it deems appropriate.s 3 Legislative action was effective, for example, during the
280. The legal dictionary defines "judicial self-restraint" as the "[s]elf-imposed discipline by judges in
deciding cases without permitting themselves to indulge in their own personal views or ideas which may be
inconsistent with existing decisional or statutory law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990).
Conversely, the dictionary defines "judicial activism" as the '"judicial philosophy which motivates judges to
depart from strict adherence to judicial precedent in favor of progressive and new social policies which are not
always consistent with the restraint expected of appellate judges. It is commonly marked by decisions calling
for social engineering and occasionally these decisions represent intrusions into legislative and executive
matters." Id at 847. The judicial restraint versus judicial activism debate is an old one, and there are obviously
valid strengths and criticisms of both doctrines. In any event, the merits of the debate are beyond the scope of
this Casenote and have been fully treated elsewhere. See generally Mark V. Tushnet, The Role of the Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 147 (1987) (exploring thoroughly the meanings
ofjudicial activism and restraint and discussing their respective merits, consequences, and significance).
281. Freeman & Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 102, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (stressing the
preference for legislative rather than judicial action as a factor favoring abrogation of Seaman's); cf. Harris v.
Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d, 1142, 1168 & n.15, 805 P.2d 873, 888 & n.15, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614,
629 & n.15 (stating that "[iun the absence of clear legislative direction ... we are unwilling to engage in
complex economic regulation under the guise ofjudicial decision-making").
282. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179-83, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337-39, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 846-48 (1980) (Clark, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for usurping the legislature's
responsibility to determine when employees should be allowed to proceed in tort against their employers for
wrongful termination of the employment contract); Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 70, 82,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 656-57 (1993) (declining to extend tort remedies for breach of contract in violation of
public policy outside of the employment contract context on policy grounds that where important policy
principles involving commercial contractual relationships are implicated, the legislature is better suited to
address the appropriate relief in such instances). Even the Seaman's court expressed caution against activism
in extending tort remedies for bad faith commercial contractual conduct: "[This] is not to say that tort remedies
have no place in such a commercial context, but ... it is wise to proceed with caution in determining their
scope and application." Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d
1158, 1167,206 Cal. Rptr. 354,363 (1984).
283. Of course, Chief Justice Lucas noted in Freeman & Mills that thus far, the state legislature has not
expressed an interest in expanding tort remedies in the context of breach of commercial contracts. Freeman
& Mills, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
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medical malpractice insurance crisis in 1975 as a response to the effects of costly
and expansive litigation of medical malpractice claims.284 In the court's view,
however, the matter of determining the availability and scope of punitive damages
remedies for bad faith denial of contract is better left to the legislature rather than
the courts.
B. Economic Ramifications
Economically efficient breaches of contract, which are often intentional and
in bad faith, are recognized as "a judicially accepted staple of our system of
commercial law."' The Restatement of Contracts, Second, seems to approve of
the "efficient breach" of contract theory, 8 6 which owes much of its acceptance
in the legal community to Judge Richard Posner and his influential economic
analysis of the law.287
Parties, especially in commercial settings such as that in which Seaman's and
its progeny made punitive damages available, voluntarily enter into contracts for
economically beneficial reasons, mostly to maximize their allocation of
resources.u s For this reason, the law has generally recognized the validity of the
284. See Ann-Marie Davidow, Note, Borrowing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. to Finance Lender
Liability Claims, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1383, 1413-14 (1990) (suggesting that a legislative response similar to that
of the California Legislature's enactment of Civil Code § 3333.2 in 1975, which capped noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice suits to $250,000 in response to then-skyrocketing malpractice premium insurance
costs, would be an appropriate answer to the increased number of lender liability suits for tortious breach in
recent years).
285. Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be
Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425, 433 (1981). Professor Diamond defined
bad faith in this context as any intentional breach motivated by crass economic self-interest. Id.
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 introductory note at 100 (1979) (recognizing
that the law of contracts has generally not distinguished between willful and non-willful breaches of contract,
and noting that a contracting party may find it "advantageous" to breach the contract if the breaching party will
still retain an overall net gain of resources after compensation of the injured party for its loss).
287. Judge Posner, in turn, acknowledges two early 1960s articles as the first modern attempts to apply
economic theories in law. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 21-22 (4th ed. 1992) (citing
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &ECON. 1 (1960)). Of course, some disagree with Judge Posner
and do not accept wholeheartedly the efficient breach of contract theory. See, e.g., Daniel L. Farber,
Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443
(1980) (finding that the efficient breach theory overlooks the costs of recovering damages for breach of
contract (transaction costs, such as attorney's fees and filing fees, etc.) and that it also compensates
inadequately the nonbreaching party for its subjective and idiosyncratic values in performance of the contract);
Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982) (arguing that the
Posner model relies on unrealistic price differentials and that it fails to take into account nonrecoverable
expenses that should be part of the equation, like attorney's fees and other costs of litigation, many of which
are intangible and thus incapable of economic classification, such as lost confidence in business dealings).
288. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 8 (reporting that parties voluntarily arrive at bilateral
exchanges through the process of bargaining, each party ultimately hoping to "maximize its own economic
advantage on terms tolerable to the other party"); POSNER, supra note 287, at 91 (stating that the fundamental
role of contract is to deter parties from acting opportunistically toward one another to facilitate the optimal
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"efficient breach" theory of contract damages.289 That theory holds that the law
should encourage intentional breach of contracts when the promisor fully
compensates the promisee by awarding as damages an amount equal to that which
the promisee would have received had the promisor fully performed the
contract.290 The promisor is better off because that party shifts its resources to a
more valuable use, despite compensating the promisee for expectation
damages.29' Economists recognize that society benefits from this efficient redis-
tribution of the resources of all involved parties.
Remedies for contractual breach in the form of punitive damages discourage
and deter this efficient reallocation of society's resources.2 92 When fashioning
damages for breach of contract, the law must be careful to avoid the waste of
resources. 293 Professor Farnsworth notes further that compelling performance in
the event of an inefficient breach distributes wealth improperly, "since the party
in breach would lose more than the injured party would gain."294 That is, the
nonbreaching party will receive performance under the contract; thus, the
nonbreaching party finds itself in at least as good a position as that in which it
found itself before the contract, while the breaching party will have lost the
opportunity to enter into a more profitable enterprise by performing the
immediate contract. Therefore, the breaching party finds itself in a less favorable
position than that in which it found itself prior to the contract.
timing of economic activity and to lessen costly measures of self-protection); John H. Barton, The Economic
Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (1972) (asserting that each party
contracts hoping that the party guesses the market more accurately than the other, or, if the parties differ in their
willingness to bear risk, that the party's judgment concerning the agreed-upon price relieves it of the risk in
purchasing at the market price).
289. See Diamond, supra note 285, at 433 (highlighting that this idea is one of the most poorly kept
secrets in legal history); see also Freeman & Mills, II Cal. 4th at 106, 900 P.2d at 682, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that the intentional breach of contract is viewed as a morally
neutral act, and "the economic insight that an intentional breach of contract may create a net benefit to society"
by permitting the optimal movement of resources supports this theory); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 16 introductory note at 100 (1979) (recognizing that the law of contracts has generally not
distinguished between willful and non-willful breaches of contract, and noting that a contracting party may find
it "advantageous" to breach the contract if the breaching party will still retain an overall net gain of resources
after compensation of the injured party for its loss); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.3, at 155 (noting that
the efficient breach notion "accords remarkably with the traditional assumptions of the law of contract
remedies").
290. This is, of course, protection of the nonbreaching party's expectation interest, and is the traditional
measure of damages for breach of a contract. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (describing
expectation damages).
291. PETER LiNZER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 419-20 (1989); POSNER, supra note 287, at 119-20.
292. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.3, at 155-56 (advocating that punitive damages should not
be an available remedy for breach of contract because the breaching party is encouraged to perform rather than
breach, and breach is more socially desirable).
293. See POSNER, supra note 287, at 118-19 (stressing that remedies which induce performance after
breach often waste resources, such as either unused production or unnecessary time).
294. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.3, at 155.
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Furthermore, fearing the potentially uncontrollable size of jury verdicts for
punitive damages, 295 allowance of punitive remedies in ordinary commercial con-
tractual settings would most likely have the undesirable effect of deterring parties
from entering into commercial contracts. In the context of preliminary nego-
tiations, reasonable minds can differ concerning whether a contract exists and at
what point it exists, regardless of any one party's legitimate opposition to the
terms or parts of a contract. Having the bad faith denial of contract tort in mind
with its potentially devastating punitive remedies,296 commercial parties would
295. Judge Dozier noted this phenomenon in an appendix to the court's decision in Woolstrum v.
Mailloux, 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 190 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983). In reversing a jury's imposition of punitive
damages, the Woolstrum court held that the defendant-farmer's negligent maintenance of his fence, by which
his cow escaped and hit plaintiff-motorist's car on the highway, and the inferences drawn from these facts,
could not amount to the requisite threshold for imposition of punitive damages: "(1) conscious disregard by
defendant of (2) a known, and (3) probable likelihood of injury to others." Woolstrum, 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
at 7, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 733. Among the factors militating against availability of punitive damages in negligence
cases, Judge Dozier listed the following: (1) "Places before the jury inflammatory evidence affecting their
dispassionate judgment as to negligence ... and compensatory damages;" (2) "[pllaces a social policy decision
in the hands of [a] jury without giving them access to the huge and broad array of facts necessary to reach an
intelligent and useful decision;" (3) "OIlury punitive damage awards of an unpredictable nature and appalling
inconsistency continue to proliferate[-n]either the Legislature nor the appellate courts have been able to
formulate coherent, reasonable guidelines and limitations for the remedy ... [; i]n practice, it lacks any
semblance of consistency between defendants, or even the same defendant, in cases tried by different juries
...;" and (4) "[t]he extreme unpredictability of punitive damages and the occasional crushing amount set by
a vindictive jury approaches a due process violation because.... the defendant lacks notice of the extent his
conduct may result in loss of his entire assets." Id. at 12, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37. Judge Dozier's list of factors
for and against the propriety of punitive damages awards is pertinent because the court stated that "[f]or the
convenience of future judicial reflection on the wisdom of punitive damages in negligence cases, we gather
the asserted 19 demerits (and three merits) of the policy from the American judicial and law review literature:'
Id. at 9 n.3, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 734 n.3; see supra, note 13 (discussing the inherent uncertainties in the imposition
and sizes of punitive damages awards, and noting the recent Supreme Court decision designed to assist courts
in controlling the inexplicable nature of punitive damages awards). Under the economic analysis of contract
law, it seems reasonable to think that punitive damages should be even less available for bad faith denial of
contract than for negligence. For one view to the contrary, though, see Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-
Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the hnposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic
Breach of Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 877 (1992) (suggesting that economic analysis of law supports
extension of tort damages for "opportunistic" breach of contract, the critical inquiry being whether the breach
is "opportunistic," as that term is defined by economists).
296. For instance, the Pennzoil court acknowledged in dicta that the jury's huge compensatory damages
verdict alone, notwithstanding the punitive damages award, could have an adverse economic effect on other
states and industries as well as on Texaco's financial situation. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 768,
865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). One commentator subsequently reported that while Texaco filed bankruptcy in 1987,
and its stock fell 28% to $27 per share, two years later, after a completed settlement with Pennzoil, Texaco's
stock rose to $60 per share, an all-time high. Robert Elder, Jr., Ten Who Made A Difference, TEx. LAW., Apr.
3, 1995, at 1. Other businesses hit with large punitive damages awards, however, have not fared so well. See
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JusTICE, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS 22 (1985)
(reporting that the "most dramatic" actions that the asbestos defendants and their insurers took, as a direct result
of the mounting financial impact presented by the increasing number of plaintiffs' victories, consisted of six
of the major asbestos producers filing for bankruptcy protection, thus to thwart, or at least mitigate, plaintiffs'
recovery of punitive damages).
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probably be less likely to enter into preliminary negotiations for business deals. 297
The law of contracts is intertwined with the dynamics of a free enterprise
economy, so courts must be careful to alter provision of contractual remedies that
may hamper the inherent functioning of the market.2 98 Entrepreneurs rely on
advance assessments about the risk of their contractual enterprises pursuant to
contract law's expectation interest remedy, which permits business to foresee the
costs that a contract, or its breach, will entail.29 It follows that commercial parties
are less likely to engage in contracting if they are unable to assess accurately the
costs associated with the prospective contract, which the punitive damages
remedy undoubtedly undermines since the amount of a punitive damages award
is far from foreseeable.
In this sense, allowing recovery of punitive damages in ordinary commercial
contractual settings has a chilling effect on the economy. The Freeman & Mills
court served the best interests of the economy in eliminating the Seaman's tort.
V. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the California Supreme Court's jurisprudence limiting tort
liability in recent years, much to the credit of Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas, 300 the
Seaman's tort of bad faith denial of existence of a contract is now dead in
California. This Casenote has shown how the Freeman & Mills decision serves
important legal and economic goals. Among them are clarification of the law
concerning remedies for bad faith contract breach and promotion of the economy
through restoration of predictability and certainty in contract damages. Justice
Holmes would have been pleased.30' So would the author who once asked if the
Seaman's tort is dead.02
297. Sebert, supra note 168, at 1642 ("[Seaman's] may even discourage parties from entering into
contractual arrangements that are incomplete or preliminary, such as the Seaman's arrangement, because the
decision enhances the risk that a defendant will be subject to punitive damages for failing to perform such a
contract").
298. See CHARLEsT. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOKONTHELAWOFDAMAGES § 138, at 567 (1935) (viewing
the foreseeability limitation on damages for breach of contract as an expression of the law's desire to diminish
the risks associated with business enterprise, which harmonizes well with the free trade economic philosophy
underlying the law of contracts).
299. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM.
L. REV. 335, 342 (1924) (discussing expectation damages for breach of contract and their foreseeability
limitation, and noting that the policy underlying this traditional rule of damages for contract breach is that the
law seeks to reduce the risk that entrepreneurs take in making contracts).
300. See Tribute, supra note 9, at 1395-97; see also Peterson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899
P.2d 905, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995) (overturning Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213
Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985), the seminal decision that extended strict products liability, for latent defects in the
premises at the time they are let to the tenant, to landlords engaged in the business of leasing dwellings).
301. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (relating Justice Holmes's view of the scope of common
law damages for breach of contract).
302. Landsdorf, supra note *, at 213.
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